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“About all you get [in exchange for a contribution] is a chance to talk to them . . .
If you have a good case you can win them over. But you have to be able to talk to
them.”
– Interest group representative interviewed in Herndon (1982, p1000)
“Access to the president should never be for sale.”
– Bob Edgar, president of Common Cause, February 26, 20131
1. Introduction
Popular opinion is that political contributions corrupt policymaking. The vast majority
of Americans believe that “money buys results in congress,” and that money biases
legislation away from the needs of average constituents and in favor of deep-pocketed
special interests (Lessig 2011, p88). Theoretical models of politics largely support these
popular views, with classic models depicting lobbying as little more than a quid pro
quo exchange of political contributions for policy (e.g., Tullock 1980, Grossman and
Helpman 1994). Insider accounts of policymaking, however, describe overtly corrupt
behavior as the rare exception, with most policymakers trying to do the right thing,
while facing severe constraints on their time and limits to their expertise (e.g., Bauer
et al. 1963, Hansen 1991, Schram 1995, Baumgartner et al. 2009). We present a model
of the political process consistent with the insider accounts of policymaking. Ours is
a model of informational lobbying, where political contributions help special interest
groups capture the attention of a time constrained policymaker, and are not provided
in the direct exchange for policy favors. We show how political contributions lead the
policymaker to focus his efforts on the most-beneficial policies. By allocating his limited
attention based on political contributions, the policymaker can guarantee better policy
outcomes than in the absence of contributions.
We develop a model of lobbying which approximates the political process described in
a number of insider accounts which emphasize how severely constrained policymakers
are in their ability to learn about and implement policy proposals (e.g., Bauer et al. 1963,
Hansen 1991). In our model, a policymaker faces a number of policy proposals and must
choose which to implement. The proposals may involve earmark funding for projects
within the policymaker’s home district.
1Common Cause is perhaps the most-recognized national organization focused on promoting campaign
finance reform. Edgar issued this statement in response to a New York Times article suggesting that
Organizing for America, a non profit organization that developed from the Obama for America campaign
organization following the 2012 presidential elections, was selling access to the president.
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Due to budget constraints, the policymaker may not be able to fund all of the projects
he believes are beneficial.2 Alternatively, the proposals may involve introducing leg-
islation reforming policy on alternative issues. Drafting, introducing, and promoting
legislation is time consuming, preventing the policymaker from introducing legislation
in all areas that may benefit his constituents. Although the proposals may not by nature
be mutually exclusive alternatives,3 resource and time constraints necessitate that the
policymaker prioritize proposals and choose only some on which to focus his efforts.
Before choosing which proposals to implement, the policymaker can assess the costs
and benefits of alternative options by meeting with interest groups and experts, reading
government reports or independent research, holding legislative hearings, or asking staff
or government agencies to research the political feasibility and constituent benefits of
different options.4 If the policymaker carefully assesses all alternatives, then he can be
certain to implement the most-beneficial options. But, this is generally not feasible. Time
and resource constraints prevent the policymaker from carefully assessing all proposals,
just as they limit the number of proposals he can implement. Faced with binding time
and resource constraints, the policymaker must prioritize proposals, first choosing which
to review and then choosing which to implement.
The policymaker is constrained and can neither review nor implement all proposals.
The main contribution of this paper is to analyze in detail one method the policymaker
may use to choose which proposals to review: a Contest for Attention. In a contest for
attention, interest groups representing each policy proposal pay political contributions in
competition for the policymaker’s limited attention, with the policymaker reviewing the
proposals whose interest groups paid the highest contributions. The policymaker sells
political access to the highest bidders. This is the type of exchange between policymakers
and interest groups that the general public and campaign finance reform advocates view
as corrupt and detrimental for the average citizen.
Our main result stands in contrast to the popular idea that selling access is necessar-
ily detrimental for policy outcomes. We show that a policymaker who sells his limited
2Frisch and Kelly (2010, 2011) present evidence that during the 2006 budget cycle the Chairman of the U.S.
House Appropriations Subcommittee for Labor-Health and Human Services allowed each rank-and-file
member of the U.S. House to request up to $400,000 in earmark funding from his subcommittee. The
allotted amount increased systematically for subcommittee members, principals in at-risk districts and
those in leadership positions. If a legislator requested a larger amount of funding from the subcommittee,
the funding was rejected or cut down to the allotted amount. This process means that legislators must
carefully decide for which earmark proposals to request funding, and the legislators may rely on political
contributions to help narrow down the set of candidates.
3The policymaker could, if budgets permitted, fund many projects, and could, if time permitted, draft,
introduce and pass legislation reforming many issues.
4See for example Baumgartner et al. (2009, p7) who observes “In the case of Congress and administrative
agencies, policymakers must choose to allocate their time among the myriad of different issues they are
called upon to address.”
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attention to the highest bidder will become fully informed about the quality of all pro-
posals even though he can directly review only some of them. Allocating attention to the
highest contributors is not detrimental for policy, but rather leads to a fully informed
policymaker and the first best policy.5
The reason for this is as follows. Each interest group’s equilibrium contribution is
strictly increasing in the quality of its proposal. Interest groups involved with high
quality proposals are willing to pay more to capture the policymaker’s attention (leading
him to review their proposals) than interest groups with lower quality proposals. This
means the policymaker directly observes the proposal quality of those who win attention
(the highest contributors), and indirectly infers the proposal quality of others from their
contributions. As a result, the policymaker is fully informed about the quality of all
proposals, and implements policy as if he directly observed each proposal’s quality.
Although in equilibrium the interest groups who submit the highest payments see their
proposals implemented, this is not because they submitted the highest payments. Rather,
it is because the groups with the highest quality proposals submit the highest payments,
and in equilibrium the policymaker implements the highest quality proposals. We show
that this insight is robust to a number of alternative assumptions and generalizations,
which we discuss in the paper and explore in detail in an online appendix.
The analysis also considers equilibrium contributions, an important consideration as
the policymaker may benefit from both collecting contributions and implementing good
policy. We show that giving attention to the highest contributors not only leads to the
first best policy, it can also result in the first best level of contributions.6 This means that
a policymaker may not need to sacrifice policy in order to maximize contributions. The
result stands in contrast to other models of lobbying in which the tradeoff between im-
plementing good policy and collecting campaign contributions plays a central roll (e.g.,
Prat 2002, Coate 2004, Cotton 2009). This is the case in our model when interest groups
share the same valuation for having their proposals implemented, when the policymaker
reviews no more proposals than he is able to implement, and when attention is allocated
through an all-pay contest for attention. Here, a policymaker who cares about both pol-
icy and contributions can be no better off than when he allocates attention through a
contest for attention before implementing the proposals he (correctly) believes are best.
There exists no other mechanism by which the policymaker can choose which proposals
to implement that will result in higher payoffs. In other settings, the contest for atten-
tion still leads to the first best policy, but does not necessarily maximize contributions
compared to the selling policy directly. Then, using a contest for attention is preferable
5First best from the perspective of the policymaker. It is also first best from the perspective of constituents
if we believe that policymaker prefers the policy that maximizes constituent welfare.
6First best from the perspective of the policymaker.
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to any other method of implementing policy when the policymaker cares enough about
policy relative to payments.
The environment with asymmetric interest groups gives insight into the effects of spe-
cial interest wealth on policy outcomes. In that setting, contributions are maximized
when the policymaker allocates attention through a handicapped contest for attention.
Such a contest is biased against wealthy interest groups, requiring them to pay higher
contributions for the same contest “score” as a lower-paying, less-wealthy group. In
the payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium, rich interest groups tend to con-
tribute more than poor interest groups, but they are no more likely to have their pro-
posals implemented. Despite higher payments from rich interest groups, the contest for
attention still leads to a fully informed policymaker who implements the first best policy.
Although the analysis is motivated by lobbying and policymaking, the underlying
framework and the implications of competing for attention are applicable to a number
of settings beyond politics. Consider the following examples. An employer wants to
hire the highest-ability applicants. An employer grants interviews to the most-persistent
applicants, those who have undertaken the greatest costs to gain the employers atten-
tion.7 Similarly, a venture capitalist may listen to pitches from the entrepreneurs who
have done the most to gain their attention. A bachelorette may accept a date from the
suitor who is most persistent in his come-ons or makes the biggest fool out of himself
in order to capture her attention (both all-pay contests), or she may accept a date from
the suitor who offers to take her out to the most-expensive restaurant (a winner-pay
contest). In each of these situations, a decision maker must allocate a limited number
of “prizes” among agents, and prefers to award the prizes to the highest-quality agents
(where quality is orthogonal to an agent’s willingness to pay for a prize). The decision
maker may review some (but not all) agents to learn their quality before choosing how
to allocate prizes.8 Agents make payments or undertake costly actions (or submit bids)
observable to the decision maker, who reviews the agents who submit the highest pay-
ments. The model suggests that by awarding attention to the highest bidder, the decision
maker (e.g., employer, venture capitalist, bachelorette) may be better able to identify and
award the prizes to the most-qualified agents (e.g., applicants, funding seekers, suitors).
2. Relationship with the Literature
The only other paper to consider a contest for attention is Cotton (2009), which brings
a highly stylized version of the contest for attention into a more traditional model of
7In the movie Wall Street, for example, Bud Fox wins his first meeting with investor Gordon Gekko by
being more persistent (and giving Gekko a nicer box of cigars) than others vying for Gekko’s attention.
8Typically, an employer does not interview all applicants, investors do not meet with all entreprenures
looking for funding, and bachelorettes do not date all interested suitors.
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lobbying, and uses the model to study campaign finance reform policies. A policymaker
chooses whether to sell policy or sell political access (which allowed disclosure of private
evidence) through an all pay auction. When the policymaker sells policy, the game is
similar to a traditional all pay auction for policy (e.g., Hillman and Riley 1989). When
the policymaker sells access, the game becomes a highly stylized version of the divisible
resource framework that we consider in Section 5 and the Online Appendix. Both Cotton
(2009) and the current paper make the point that a policymaker who sells attention
(i.e., political access) can become informed about a policy by observing payments made
by interest groups as they vie for attention. Cotton (2009) makes this point with a
very simple version of the contest for attention in the process of deriving results about
contribution limits and taxes. Its focus is on campaign finance reform, not the contest
for attention itself. The current paper, on the other hand, considers contests for attention
in detail. We generalize the contest for attention, show that the main insight extends to
a variety of environments, and derive a number of important new results that were not
possible in the stylized version of the contest for attention considered previously.9
A handful of other papers have also modeled the connection between political contri-
butions and access to policymakers (i.e., attention). In Austen-Smith (1998) and Cotton
(2012), interest groups must pay a price set by a policymaker in order to engage in infor-
mational lobbying. Both consider how a policymaker may offer more access to wealthy
interest groups, who are willing to pay more.10 These papers focus on how a policy-
maker restricts access in order to extract rent from the political process. In contrast, we
focus on whether a time-constrained policymaker can sell attention in such a way (e.g.,
through an all-pay auction) that he is able to learn about and implement the best pol-
icy, despite not having the capacity to review all policy options.11 Groll and Ellis (2014)
model a market for political access where commercial lobbying firms connect citizens to
politicians. In the political access models of Austen-Smith (1995) and Lohmann (1995),
contributions lend credibility to unverifiable information presented by interest groups
(i.e., burning money). In our framework, as well as the other political access papers
9For example, Cotton (2009) finds that selling attention maximizes policy utility but results in lower pay-
ments than selling policy. The current paper illustrates that this earlier finding is a consequence of the
policy framework; in other settings, selling attention may lead to the first best outcome in terms of both
policy and payments.
10Cotton (2012) shows that a policymaker may exclude less-wealthy interest groups from the policymaking
process because doing so allows him to attract higher payments from the more-wealthy interest groups,
and extract more rent from the policymaking process. Interestingly, Cotton (2012) shows how less-wealthy
interest groups may be better off when they are excluded from the policymaking process. This is because
it may be better to be ignored by the policymaker than to be targetted by his rent-seeking efforts.
11Notice that the policymaker will not become fully informed if he sets a fixed price for attention, as he
does in Austen-Smith (1998) and Cotton (2012).
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discussed above, information is verifiable and may be learned with certainty by a poli-
cymaker who devotes attention to an issue. In Levy and Razin (2013), interest groups
compete in an all pay auction, and the winner has its proposal considered by policymak-
ers. What is meant by consideration differs greatly between their framework and ours.
In their framework, there is no uncertainty about proposals, and consideration means
being put up for a vote in the legislature, facing off against the status quo policy. In
our framework, consideration means a policymaker learns about the costs and benefits
of a proposal, before deciding whether to move forward with it. Their work focuses on
how a status quo policy evolves over time. Ours focuses on how competing for attention
improves the policymakers ability to learn about the best policy.
The majority of the literature models lobbying as a system of quasi bribery, where
contributions are given in exchange for policy outcomes (e.g., Tullock 1980, Grossman
and Helpman 1994), or as a system of information provision in the absence of political
contributions (e.g., Austen-Smith and Wright 1992, Cotton and Dellis 2012). Bennedsen
and Feldmann (2006) and Dahm and Porteiro (2008) consider both information provision
and the exchange of money for policy.12 Although the theoretical literature focuses on
the use of political contributions to buy policy, this role of contributions is supported by
neither insider accounts of the lobbying process nor empirical evidence.13 Rather, em-
pirical accounts of lobbying suggest that contributions help interest groups capture the
attention of policymakers, assuring that their policies receive full consideration. For ex-
ample, Langbein (1986), Ansolabehere et al. (2002) and Hall and Wayman (1990) present
evidence that interest groups provide political contributions in order to secure access to
policymakers. See also the excellent descriptions of the policymaking process in Bauer
et al. (1963), Hansen (1991) and Baumgartner et al. (2009), and the surveys by Herndon
(1982), Schram (1995) and Makinson (2003).
There is a substantial literature on the efficient allocation of resources. Esteban and
Ray (2006) show that both high wealth and economic desirability increase lobbying by
special interests, and show that this can lead to greater misallocation when these fac-
tors are not observable. Cotton (2013) and Fullerton and McAfee (1999) consider en-
vironments in which a decision maker wants to allocate a limited resource based on
some characteristic orthogonal to applicant value. Cotton (2013) considers a journal that
wants to maximize the quality of accepted papers, but can review only so many papers
before choosing which to publish. It shows how the journal can maintain an acceptable
12In these papers, interest groups can produce information, which influences the policymaker’s beliefs
about the benefits of alternative proposals, and therefore changes the price of buying policy favors. In
these models, political contributions continue to buy policy.
13Note that a correlation between political contributions and policy outcomes is consistent with both a
money-for-policy story and a money-for-access story, where those with more-convincing arguments pay
more for access.
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refereeing burden and maximize journal quality by imposing submission costs (e.g., a
combination of fees and delays) on authors. The costs discourage submissions from the
authors who believe their papers have low probability of acceptance, and allow the edi-
tors to focus on more promising papers. Unlike in our paper, there is no contest in this
environment, just fixed submission costs set by an editor (more closely comparable to
lobbying models in which a policymaker sets the price of access, e.g., Austen-Smith 1998,
Cotton 2012). More related to our current paper is Fullerton and McAfee (1999), where
a contest designer must select a subset of agents to participate in a research tournament.
They show that using a contest to allocate entry into the research tournament ensures
that only the most promising researchers enter the tournament. In our setting and in
Fullerton and McAfee, higher quality agents (e.g., those advocating on behalf of higher
quality policies) are willing to pay more to “participate” in the next stage of the game,
whether the next stage is our paper’s review process or Fullerton and McAfee’s research
tournament.
All-pay auctions are typically used to directly allocate prizes (e.g., Baye et al. 1993,
Hillman and Riley 1989). In our framework the all-pay auction is used to allocate the
policymaker’s attention. When we allow for observable agent asymmetries, the poli-
cymaker’s preferred method for choosing which proposals to review involves a handi-
capped all-pay auction. Such an auction fully adjusts interest group payments to account
for known heterogeneity. There exists a growing literature on handicapping contests.
Siegel (2014) develops a general all-pay contest framework with handicaps in an envi-
ronment with complete information. Kirkegaard (2010) considers the use of handicaps
in a model with private information about valuations. Eso and Szentes (2007) show that
a version of a handicap auction can maximize revenue in a game in which the auctioneer
chooses how much information to reveal to the bidders about the value of the good. The
present paper assumes that bidders reveal information to the auctioneer (not the other
way around), and the auctioneer’s goal is to collect as much information as possible
(rather than revenue maximization). We show how a handicapped auction can be used
to maximize the revelation of information, not only to maximize revenue. None of these
other models use a contest to elicit information about bidder types.
3. Model with symmetric interest groups
We begin with a relatively simple version of the model. There are n symmetric pol-
icy proposals that differ only in quality. The policymaker reviews one of the proposals
before choosing one proposal to implement. This symmetric game with one review slot
and one implementation slot provides a simple setting in which to develop intuition for
our main results. After presenting the results for the game with one review slot and one
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implementation slot, we show that the results continue to hold when the policymaker
reviews and implements multiple proposals. In later sections, we allow for observable
asymmetries between the proposals (specifically, between preference intensity of the in-
terest groups advocating in favor of the proposals).
3.1. Setting. A policymaker is faced with a set of policy proposals N = {1, ..., n}, and
must choose which of these n proposals to implement. The proposals may represent
different earmark funding requests for projects within the policymaker’s district, or re-
form proposals on different issues. Let qi denote the quality of proposal i ∈ N and
q = {q1, ..., qn} the underlying state of the world. Each qi is the independent realization
of a random variable distributed on Q = (0, qmax] according to continuously differ-
entiable distribution F with density f .14 Distribution F is common knowledge. The
policymaker is ex ante uncertain about the realized quality of each proposal.
The policymaker has the resources to implement one of the proposals. Let pi = 1
(pi = 0) indicate that the policymaker implements (does not implement) proposal i,
where p = {p1, ..., pn} denotes the full policy outcome.
Before implementing a proposal, the policymaker may review one of the proposals to
directly observe its quality. Let ri = 1 (ri = 0) indicate that the policymaker reviews
(does not review) proposal i, where r = {r1, ..., rn}. A review may involve meeting
with IGs or lobbyists to gain a better understanding of the proposal, asking staff or
government agencies to conduct research, or holding legislative hearings. When the
policymaker reviews proposal i, he perfectly observes qi. Let σ = {σ1, ..., σn} represented
the information directly observed by the policymaker by reviewing a proposal, where
σi = qi when he reviews i and σi = ∅ when he does not review i.
Each proposal i ∈ N is supported by an independent interest group (IG), an advocate
on behalf of its proposal. IGi refers to the IG associated with issue i. Each IG, an expert
on its respective project or policy area, privately observes qi at the beginning of the game.
Before the policymaker decides which proposal to review, the IGs may independently
provide payments to the policymaker in an effort to capture his attention. Such payments
may be a monetary political contributions or in-kind transfers. Let ci ≥ 0 denote any
“contribution” made by IGi, where c = {c1, ..., cn}.
We adapt an all-pay auction to model the allocation of the “review slot” based on
payments.15 The IGs provide payments, and the policymaker reviews the proposal asso-
ciated with the IG that provided the highest payment. In the “contest for attention” for
a single review slot, ri = 1 if ci > cj for all j 6= i, and ties are broken randomly.
14The qualitative nature of the results continue to hold if we alternatively assume that each proposal’s
quality is a realization of a different random variable, as long as all distributions are common knowledge.
15Hillman and Riley (1989) apply an all-pay auction to model the sale of policy favors, and Cotton (2009)
argues that the all-pay auction may also be used to model the sale of political access.
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The policymaker’s payoff is made up of contribution utility uc and policy utility up:
UPM = (1− λ)uc(c) + λup(p; q). (1)
Contribution utility uc is strictly increasing in individual contributions ci (and total pay-
ments ∑ ci). Policy utility is strictly increasing in the quality of the implemented pro-
posal, ∑ piqi. All else equal, the policymaker prefers to implement the highest quality
proposal. Therefore, quality may represent net benefit to the policymaker’s constituents
or effects on the policymaker’s chances of reelection. Parameter λ ∈ (0, 1] represents
how much the policymaker cares about policy relative to contributions.
An IG’s payoff depends on whether its proposal is implemented and its payment. For
each i ∈ N ,
Ui(pi, ci) = vpi − ci. (2)
Parameter v represents the relative value IGs put on policy outcomes relative to pay-
ments; in later sections we allow this parameter to differ across IGs. An IG is an ad-
vocate in that its willingness to pay to have it implemented is independent of proposal
quality.16
The game takes place as follows. First, each IGi privately observes its own proposal’s
quality qi, and then chooses contribution ci. Second, the policymaker reviews the pro-
posal associated with the highest payment, directly learning that proposal’s quality. He
updates his beliefs about the quality of the other proposals accounting for the payments
made by the IGs. Third, the policymaker chooses one proposal to implement.
3.2. Preliminaries. The analysis solves for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game.
A complete description of equilibrium must define:
• Equilibrium contribution strategy C∗i for each IG, where C∗i (qi) describes the equi-
librium value of ci when IGi observes that its proposal is quality qi.
• Equilibrium implementation strategy, P∗, used by the policymaker to determine
which proposal to implement given c and σ.
• The policymaker’s posterior beliefs, given c and σ. We denote these beliefs by µ.
These components constitute an equilibrium if (i) no IG has an incentive to deviate from
ci = C∗i (qi) given the payment strategies of the other IGs and the implementation strat-
egy of the policymaker, (ii) the policymaker’s implementation strategy P∗ is sequentially
rational given his beliefs µ, and (iii) the policymaker’s posterior beliefs µ are consistent
with C∗1 , ..., C
∗
n and σ. Function µ denotes the policymaker’s updated beliefs about q,
16This is in contrast to most auction models which assume valuations are unknown. We make the alter-
native assumption that v is known, but that agents have private information about their qualifications, a
characteristic orthogonal to their value. This is consistent with situations in which a policymaker knows
how well financed interest groups are, but does not know how different policies will benefit his con-
stituents or reelection chances.
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where µ(q˜|c,ω) is the probability the policymaker puts on state q˜ ∈ Q given contribu-
tion profile c and review outcome ω. Similarly, µi(q˜i|c,ω) is the posterior probability
proposal i is quality q˜i.
We impose an assumption on the behavior of IGs when indifferent between multiple
contributions.
A1 An IG that is indifferent between multiple contributions chooses the contribution
that maximizes the expected probability that its proposal is implemented, given
the equilibrium strategies of the other IGs and the policymaker.
This assumption plays a roll in the analysis only in cases where IGs are indifferent be-
tween contributing according to equilibrium function C∗i and contributing other amounts.
Any equilibrium found under A1 will also be a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the ab-
sence of the assumption. In the Online Appendix, we consider implications of both this
assumption and the alternative assumption that an indifferent IG minimizes payments.
Full-information equilibria. The primary insight of our paper shows how the policymaker
becomes fully informed about the quality of all proposals when he sells attention (i.e.,
the one review slot) to the highest bidder. We say that the contest for attention leads
to the policymaker being “fully-informed” if there exists an equilibrium of the contest
for attention in which his equilibrium beliefs, µ, put probability 1 on the true state of
the world: µ(q|c,ω) = 1. We begin by providing a sufficient condition on the IGs’
equilibrium payment strategies to guarantee that the policymaker is fully informed.
Lemma 1. If C∗i
′(qi) > 0 for each i ∈ N and all possible qi ∈ Q, then the policymaker is fully
informed in equilibrium.
When the policymaker reviews a proposal, he perfectly observes qi, and therefore has
correct beliefs about its quality. Lemma 1 shows that in equilibrium the policymaker
will also have correct beliefs about the quality of the n− 1 proposals he does not review.
Strictly monotonic payment functions mean there is a one-to-one mapping between the
quality of each proposal and the payment made by its IG. In equilibrium, when the
policymaker observes payment ci, he expects the payment was generated by the IG’s
equilibrium contribution function C∗i . Because C
∗
i is strictly increasing, it is invertible;
we define Q∗i ≡ C∗−1i . The policymaker therefore updates his beliefs about qi upon
observing ci, expecting that qi = Q∗i (ci). In equilibrium, these beliefs are correct.
We refer to any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for which the condition in Lemma 1
is satisfied as a full-information equilibrium. The analysis limits attention to such
equilibria.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is helpful to determine the policymaker’s se-
quentially rational policy choice in any full-information equilibrium. In the final stage
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of the game, the policymaker implements the proposal with the highest expected quality
given his beliefs µ.17 Denote the policymaker’s posterior beliefs about qi by Eµqi.
Lemma 2. If the policymaker is fully informed, then in equilibrium he implements the highest
quality proposal with probability 1.
Payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium. Lemma 2 shows that in any full-information
equilibrium, the policymaker implements the highest quality proposal. This means that
an IG with proposal quality qi expects equilibrium benefit B(qi), where
B(qi) = vF(qi)n−1. (3)
Parameter v is the value to an IG of having its proposal implemented, and F(qi)n−1 is
the probability that proposal i is the highest quality proposal. Expression (3) gives the
expected benefit to an IG when the policymaker certainly implements the highest quality
proposal. It implies an individual rationality constraint for each IGi:
ci ≤ B(qi). (4)
No IG will ever pay more than its expected benefit from lobbying, and in any full-
information equilibrium, its expected benefit equals B(qi).
Lemma 3. There does not exist a full-information equilibrium in which C∗i (qi) > B(qi) for any
i ∈ N and qi ∈ Q.
The maximum feasible payment from IGi equals B(qi). We define a payment-maximizing
full-information equilibrium as a full-information equilibrium in which all IGs pay
their maximum feasible amounts: C∗i = B for each i ∈ N and qi ∈ Q.
3.3. Solving the Contest for Attention. The preliminary analysis determined that in
any full-information equilibrium, the policymaker’s posterior beliefs are always correct,
and he implements the first best policy. Here, we begin with a full characterization
of the set of symmetric full-information equilibria of the contest for attention game.
In a symmetric full-information equilibrium, all IGs play the same strategy C¯∗, where
C¯∗′(qi) > 0 for all possible qi.
To derive the equilibrium payment function, we consider IGi’s best response when
all other IGs contribute according to C¯∗. Because the other n − 1 IGs contribute ac-
cording to the equilibrium payment function, the policymaker has correct beliefs about
their proposal qualities, regardless of whether they win attention. If they do win atten-
tion, the policymaker observes qj directly. If they do not win attention, the policymaker
(correctly) believes Eµqi = Q¯∗(ci), where Q¯∗ ≡ C¯∗−1. We derive equilibrium payment
17We assume that he breaks ties randomly. In equilibrium, ties do not occur.
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functions C¯∗ such that IGi has no incentive to deviate from contributing according to the
strategy when it expects other IGs to do the same.
No incentive to over-contribute — We first explain why IGi prefers ci = C¯∗(qi) to any
higher contribution. If IGi provides the equilibrium contribution, it submits the highest
contribution, wins attention and has its proposal implemented if and only if it has the
highest quality proposal.18 Contributing ci > C¯∗(qi) introduces the possibility that IGi
wins attention even when it does not have the highest quality proposal. This does not
increase the probability that proposal i is implemented, however, as winning attention
guarantees that the policymaker reviews and directly learns qi. Since the policymaker’s
beliefs about the quality of the other (n − 1) proposals are accurate, the policymaker
continues to implement proposal i if and only if it is the highest quality proposal. There-
fore, overbidding requires a larger payment without providing an expected benefit to
the IG.
No incentive to under-contribute — The equilibrium contribution function must also
be such that no IG wants to under-contribute compared to the equilibrium payment. If
IGi deviates downward, its costs decrease (a benefit). But, it also decreases the prob-
ability that IGi submits the highest payment and has its policy implemented (a cost).
To rule out such deviations, a decrease in contribution must lead to a sufficiently large
decrease in the probability of winning attention. This will be the case when the slope of
the equilibrium contribution function is sufficiently low.19
We will derive a condition on the equilibrium contribution function C¯∗ such that each
IGi prefers ci = C¯∗(qi) to any lower amount when the other IGs contribute according to
the equilibrium function. Notice that for any contribution ci ≤ C¯∗(qi), IGi wins attention
and has its proposal implemented if and only if it provides the highest contribution. If
another IG provides a higher contribution, then IGi will not win attention. The policy-
maker will have expectations that Eµqi = Q¯∗(ci), which will be less than the observed
quality of the IG that contributes according to the equilibrium function and wins at-
tention. The policymaker does not observe the true quality of qi, and will therefore
implement the other proposal regardless of whether that proposal was actually higher
quality than i. If, on the other hand, IGi provides the highest contribution, then IGi
wins attention. Even before the policymaker reviews proposal i, he expects that it is
highest quality proposal based on the contributions. After he reviews the proposal, he
18Ties happen with probability zero in equilibrium.
19When contributions are increasing in quality at a low rate, the distribution of equilibrium contributions
is more dense than when contributions are increasing in quality at a higher rate. This means that a given
decrease in IGi’s contribution is more likely to change the rank ordering of contributions in the low slope
case than in the high slope case.
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learns that i is even higher quality than he expected, and will implement it over the other
options.
The expected payoff to IGi from any ci ≤ C¯∗(qi) is
EUi = F(Q¯∗(ci))n−1v− ci. (5)
Given the definition of B from (3), the expected payoff can be rewritten
EUi = B(Q¯∗(ci))− ci. (6)
For C¯∗ to constitute an equilibrium, IGi must prefer contributing ci = C¯∗(qi) to any
lower value. Contributing the equilibrium amount results in expected payoff EUi =
B(qi)− C¯∗(qi), which must be larger than (6) for all ci < C¯∗(qi). This will be true for all
possible qi when
C¯∗′(qi) ≤ B′(qi) for all qi ∈ Q. (7)
Individual rationality further requires that C¯∗(0) = 0.
Summary of equilibrium requirements — These conditions and the requirement that a
full-information equilibrium requires C¯∗′(qi) > 0 for all qi ∈ Q are the foundation of the
first proposition.
Proposition 1. For any function C¯ such that 0 < C¯′(qi) ≤ B′(qi) for all qi ∈ Q and C¯(0) = 0,
there exists a full-information equilibrium in which C∗i = C¯ for each i = N . No other symmetric
full-information equilibria exist.
Notice the implications of this result. First, it establishes that the policymaker may
become fully informed about the quality of all proposals, even if he only reviews one of
them. In equilibrium, the fully-informed policymaker is guaranteed to implement the
highest-quality proposal. Selling attention to the highest contributor improves policy
outcomes. Second, it shows that there are in fact many full-information equilibria.
Payment-maximizing equilibrium — Next, we describe the full-information equilib-
rium that maximizes contributions from all IGs, and the payments received by the poli-
cymaker. Such an equilibrium corresponds with the highest level of competition between
the IGs, an equilibrium characteristic that may serve as a focal point and lead to coordi-
nation on such an equilibrium.
Corollary 1. There exists an equilibrium in which C∗i = B for each i = N . This is the payment-
maximizing full-information equilibrium.
In the payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium, each IG contributes ci =
B(qi) = F(qi)n−1v. The policymaker extracts all rent from the policymaking process.
From an ex ante perspective, the expected individual contribution is
∫
f (qi)B(qi)dqi,
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and the sum of total expected contributions equals
n
∫
f (qi)B(qi)dqi = v
∫
n f (qi)F(qi)n−1dqi = v.
The finding that total IG payments equal v is remarkable. Even if the policymaker ex-
plicitly sold proposal implementation (rather than attention) to the highest bidder or
by making a take-it-or-leave-it price to one of the IGs, he would not be able to col-
lect more than v in expected payments from the IGs. There does not exist a method
for deciding which proposal to implement that results in higher payments than the
payment-maximizing equilibrium of the contest for attention. And unlike directly sell-
ing proposal implementation to the IGs, the contest for attention has the added benefit
of guaranteeing the first-best policy.
Proposition 2. The payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium results in the first best
policy and the first best level contributions for the policymaker. There exists no other method for
implementing policy that leads to higher expected payoffs for the policymaker.
This results implies that a policymaker who cares about both the quality of the imple-
mented proposal and collecting payments can do no better than first allocating attention
through a contest and then implementing the proposal he believes best. Such an alloca-
tion method guarantees both the first best policy outcome and the maximum expected
payments.
This means there does not necessarily exist a tradeoff between implementing the best
policy and maximizing political contributions. This result is in contrast to other papers
on lobbying, where the driving force between the results is a trade off between imple-
menting policy that is good for constituents, and implementing policy that encourages
contributions from special interests (e.g., Prat 2002, Coate 2004, Bennedsen and Feld-
mann 2006, Cotton 2009).
This result, however, is not as strong in Section 4 where we consider IG asymmetries.
There, we show that the contest for attention continues to guarantee the first best pro-
posal implementation even if IGs differ in their valuations. However, the contest for
attention will no longer guarantee the highest possible total payments from IGs com-
pared to any other method of choosing which policy to implement. Although it will
maximize payments compared to any other method that guarantees the first best policy.
3.4. Implementing multiple proposals. The above results extend to a setting where
the policymaker reviews the k proposals associated with the highest IG payments, and
then implements the m proposals he believes are highest quality, where 1 ≤ k ≤ m <
n. Here, we focus on the case where the number of review slots is no greater than
the number of proposals the policymaker can emphasize, including the extreme case
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where the policymaker reviews only a single proposal before implementing multiple
proposals.20 By allocating as few as one review slot through a contest for attention, the
policymaker becomes fully informed about the quality of all proposals and is able to
implement the m highest-quality alternatives.
There are a number of differences between the analysis in the case where k = m = 1
that we consider above, and the analysis in this section. First, the ex ante expected benefit
to IGi when the policymaker certainly implements the m highest-quality proposals is
now
B(qi; m) = v
m−1
∑
y=0
(n− 1)!
(n− 1− y)!y! (1− F(qi))
yF(qi)n−1−y, (8)
the value of having its proposal implemented times the probability that fewer than m
other proposals are higher quality.
Second, when k < m there is the possibility that in equilibrium the policymaker im-
plements a proposal without first reviewing it. This is consistent with the idea that a
legislator may vote on issues he has not had time to study in detail.21 This means the
policymaker will implement some proposals without first reviewing them, thereby alter-
ing the incentives IGs have to over-contribute and signal higher quality proposals than
they actually have. If it is sufficiently low-cost to inflate the policymaker’s beliefs about
qi, then the IG will prefer to over-contribute compared to equilibrium. This means that
C¯∗′(qi) must not be too low; it must be sufficiently costly to signal a marginally higher
quality. Otherwise, IGs would have the incentive to at least marginally inflate their pay-
ments in an effort to provide the impression (when they are not reviewed) that their
proposals are higher quality than they truly are.
The incentives IGs have to under-contribute compared to equilibrium are similar to
the previous section. The equilibrium requires that C¯∗′(qi) ≤ B′(qi; m) for all qi ∈ Q,
which is the multiple-proposal equivalent to (7) from the previous section. Proposition
3 establishes that the constraint that C¯∗ be increasing at a sufficiently hight rate never
contradicts the constraint that it must be increasing at no greater rate than B.
20In the Online Appendix, we consider the case where k > m, and show that the policymaker can still
become fully informed by selling access through an all pay auction. However, when k > m, there does not
exist a payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium. Because of this, it is reasonable to expect that
policymaker would never allocate more than m access slots.
21House Judiciary Chairman John Conyers (D-Michigan) explained in July 2009, “I love these Members of
Congress, they get up say ‘Read the bill.’ What good is reading the bill if it’s a thousand pages and you
don’t have two days and two lawyers to find out what it means after you read the bill?” See video of the
event at http://www.cnsnews.com/node/51610. Former U.S. Representative Thomas Downey (D-New
York) explains further: “It is difficult to see Members of Congress. Not because they hide themselves from
you, but because they are very busy, between committee work, and traveling back and forth from their
districts, maintaining their office appointments, and seeing their constituents” (Schram 1995).
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Proposition 3. In the contest for attention game where 1 ≤ k ≤ m < n, there exists a function
C˜ such that
i. 0 ≤ C˜′(qi) < B′(qi; m) for all qi ∈ Q, and
ii. for all functions C¯ such that C˜′(qi) < C¯′(qi) ≤ B′(qi; m) for all qi ∈ Q and C¯(0) = 0,
there exists a full information equilibrium in which C∗i = C¯ for each i = N .
The equilibrium in which C∗i = B(·; m) is the unique payment-maximizing full-information
equilibrium.
In the payment-maximizing equilibrium, total expected payments equal mv, implying
that once again the policymaker is able to fully-extract all of the rent from the policymak-
ing process. Again, a policymaker who cares about both the quality of the implemented
proposal and collecting IG payments will never expect higher utility than when he al-
locates attention to the highest bidder before implementing the proposals he believes
best.
Proposition 4. Consider the contest for attention game with k review slots and m implemented
proposals, where 1 ≤ k ≤ m < n. The payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium results
in the first best policy and the first best level contributions for the policymaker. There exists no
other method for implementing policy that leads to higher expected payoffs for the policymaker.
3.5. Importance of reviewing at least one proposal. In equilibrium, each IG contributes
according to a payment function that is strictly increasing in its proposal’s quality, and
the policymaker correctly infers the quality of each proposal from the IG payments. This
means that ex post, after the IGs provide their contributions, reviewing a proposal never
improves the accuracy of the policymaker’s (already fully-accurate) beliefs. Despite the
ex post redundancy of the review process, it remains an essential part of the policy-
maker’s allocation method, essential for the policymaker to become fully informed.
Proposition 5. If the policymaker reviews no proposals, then there does not exist a full-information
equilibrium.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Some probability of being reviewed
is needed to maintain the separating equilibrium in which an IG’s payment is strictly
increasing in the quality of its proposal. If the policymaker reviews no proposal but con-
tinues to expect that IGs contribute according to strictly increasing payment functions,
then the IGs each have an incentive to increase their payments, effectively inflating the
policymaker’s beliefs about the quality of their proposals. In this case, each IG deviates
to pay ci = C¯∗(qmax), resulting in the maximum policymaker beliefs about the quality
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of its proposal. Without any review, the policymaker is unable to infer anything about a
proposal from its IG’s payment, and in equilibrium ci = 0 for all i.22
Under the assumptions of the model, the policymaker never has an incentive to review
more than one proposal, as he becomes fully informed about the quality of all proposals
in equilibrium, even when k = 1. In Section 5, we discuss cases of noisy IG quality
signals, and unobservable IG asymmetries; cases where reviewing additional proposals
may be beneficial.
4. Model with Asymmetric Interest Groups
In reality, IGs differ in their benefit from having their proposal implemented, or op-
portunity costs of providing political contributions. In this section, we allow for such
observable asymmetries between the IGs. Except for the following changes, the under-
lying setting remains identical to the previous sections.
The IGs’ payoffs depend on whether their proposal is implemented and their pay-
ment: ui(pi, ci) = vi pi − ci. Parameter vi represents the relative value IGi puts on policy
outcomes relative to payments. A higher vi may be interpreted as either IGi having more
at stake from their proposal being implemented, or as i being more wealthy or having
lower costs of funds.23 Without loss of generality, we rank order IGs according to their
value, such that v1 > v2 > ... > vn.24
The policymaker reviews k and then implements m proposals, where 1 ≤ k ≤ m < n.
The expected benefit to IGi if the policymaker always implements the m highest-quality
proposals can be defined as Bi(qi; m), which differs from B(qi; m) as defined in (8) only
in that v is replaced by vi in its argument. Where clear, we refer to Bi(·; m) by Bi. Given
that v1 ≥ ... ≥ vn, it follows that Bn(qi) ≤ Bi(qi) for all i and qi > 0; the benefit to
22Proposition 5 relies on A1. If we eliminate A1 and impose no restriction on the behavior of indifferent
IGs, there will exist an equilibrium in which all IGs are indifferent between any contribution, and each
contribute according to B. When all other IGs contribute according to B, any ci ∈ [0, B(qmax)] is a best
responses for IGi, each giving an expected payoff of zero. Therefore, each IG is willing to contribute
ci = B(qmax), but we see no reason why it would do so. Unlike in the earlier sections, here such a
contribution does not stand out from the other contributions over which an IG is indifferent. Because
of this, we impose A1, putting some structure on the choice of contribution by an indifferent IG, and
therefore ruling out any full-information equilibrium when there are no reviews.
23To see this, suppose that IG i receives payoffs uˆi = vˆi − τˆibi when its policy is implemented and uˆi =
−τˆibi when it is not implemented. Here, vˆi is the weight on policy and τˆi is the weight on payments. Any
positive affine transformation of uˆi maintains preferences. We therefore define vi ≡ vˆi/τˆi and ui ≡ uˆi/τˆ,
and rewrite agent i’s preferences as we defined them in the body of the paper. An increase in vˆi and a
decrease in τˆi are indistinguishable in the model.
24The analysis considers IG differences in vi. Additionally, we could incorporate differences in quality
distribution, Fi, allowing IGs to, for example, differ in the expected quality of their proposals. Allowing
such differences complicates the analysis, particularly the functions for Bi, without providing additional
insight. The main results continue to hold.
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IGn from participating in a full-information equilibrium is lower than the benefit to any
other IG.
In the previous section, the contest for attention was symmetric, giving the same
weight to all IGs’ payments, and awarding attention to the k IGs that provided the
highest payments. If the policymaker uses such a symmetric contest to allocate atten-
tion when IGs are asymmetric, he will still become fully informed and implement the
first best policy in equilibrium, as long as the differences between the IGs are not too
large. While a symmetric contest for attention results in the first best policy, it is optimal
for a policymaker who also cares about contributions.25 For the remainder of this sec-
tion, we allow for a more general asymmetric (i.e. “handicapped”) contest for attention,
which requires greater payments from some IGs than from others for the same equilib-
rium probability of winning attention. We show how such a contest is optimal for the
policymaker compared to any other method that guarantees the first best policy.
We generalize the contest for attention, modeling it as an asymmetric all-pay contest
defined as a set of score functions θ = {θ1, ..., θn}, one for each IG. When IGi provides
payment ci, its “score” is given by θi(ci), where θi(0) = 0 and θ′i(ci) > 0 for all ci > 0.
The proposals associated with the highest scores in the contests receive attention. That
is, the policymaker reviews proposal i if fewer than k other proposals have θj(cj) > θi(ci).
A policymaker may require higher payments from IGs with higher vi than from IGs
with lower vi, in exchange for the same equilibrium probability of winning attention.
The revenue maximizing contest for attention involves score functions that fully adjust
for observable IG asymmetries. Such a contest involves θi = B−1i for all i ∈ N. In
equilibrium, each IG provides a payment Ci(vi) = Bi(vi), and an IG wins attention
and is and has its policy implemented if and only if it has one of the k highest qi. In
equilibrium, the policymaker implements the first best policy, and collects the maximum
possible revenue compared to any other mechanism that guarantees the first best policy.
We provide a detailed analysis in the Online Appendix. Proposition 9 summarizes this
result.
Proposition 6. Consider the game with asymmetric IGs and a handicapped contest for attention
in which θi = B−1i for all i, and where 1 ≤ k ≤ m < n. There exists a full-information
equilibrium in which C∗i = Bi for all i = 1, ..., n. This is the unique payment-maximizing
full-information equilibrium.
In equilibrium, IGs with higher vi tend to pay more than IGs with lower vi, imply-
ing higher contributions from more-wealthy groups or groups with more to gain from
having their proposal implemented. This does not, however, translate into either the
25A detailed analysis game with asymmetric IGs is included in the Online Appendix. It includes the case
of a symmetric contest for attention.
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attention or implementation decisions being biased in favor of more-wealthy IGs. In
equilibrium, more-wealthy groups pay more, but the contest accounts for observable
differences between IGs, and in equilibrium only the highest quality IGs (regardless of
wealth) gain attention and have their proposals implemented.
Corollary 2. Consider the game with asymmetric IGs and a handicapped contest for attention
in which θi = B−1i for all i, and where 1 ≤ k ≤ m < n. In equilibrium, wealthy IGs tend
to contribute more than less wealthy IGs, but they are no more likely to have their proposals
implemented and are no better off than less wealthy IGs.
When IGs differ only in proposal quality, a policymaker who cares about both col-
lecting payments and proposal quality can be no better off than when he sells attention
to the highest bidders before implementing the proposals he believes best. This pro-
cedure for implementing policy results in the first best total payment (equal to mv in
expectation) and the first best policy outcome. It no longer guarantees the first best
total payment in the environment with asymmetric IGs. In this section, the payment-
maximizing full-information equilibrium guarantees the first best policy outcome, and
guarantees the highest possible payments compared to any other full-information equi-
librium. But, it no longer guarantees the highest payments compared to certain methods
of selling policy.26 The payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium describes the
most-profitable outcome associated with any mechanism that guarantees the first best
policy outcome. A contest for attention that results in this outcome is preferred to any
other method of awarding policy, as long as the policymaker cares enough about policy
relative to payments (i.e. as long as λ in his payoff function is not too small).
5. Other Considerations
We summarize a number of extensions, which illustrate the generality of our results.
Detailed consideration of these extensions is provided in the Online Appendix.
Awarding attention through a winner-pay auction–We have thus far modeled the contest
for attention as an all-pay auction. The policymaker may still be fully informed and
guaranteed to implement the first best policy if he uses a winner-pay auction to award
attention. However, with a winner pay contest, no payment-maximizing full-information
equilibrium exists. This means that potential revenue is higher when the contest for
attention takes the form of an all-pay contest rather than a winner-pay contest.
26For example, the policymaker could make a take it or leave it offer to the m highest value IGs, committing
to implement IGi’s proposal if and only if ci = vi for i = 1, ..., m. It is an equilibrium under such an
alternative mechanism for the m highest value IGs to contribute ci = vi, and such a mechanism results
in the maximum feasible expected sum of payments. It does not, however, guarantee the first best policy
outcome.
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Other methods for allocating attention–The Online Appendix discusses alternative ways
that the policymaker may sell access or choose policy. We also consider an alternative
version of the game in which IGs can send cheap talk messages instead of payments
prior to the allocation of attention.
Noisy quality signals–The model assumes that IGs perfectly observe the quality of their
own proposals. It is possible, however, that IGs only observe an imperfect signal of their
proposal’s quality and are not perfectly aware of how the policymaker will perceive
their proposal’s quality following a review. In this case, the policymaker learns about
the private signal of all IGs from their contributions, but he only becomes fully informed
about the true quality of the proposals he actually reviews.
Allocating a divisible resource–We consider an alternative setting in which the policy-
maker chooses how to allocate a divisible resource when a project’s optimal allocation is
increasing in its own quality and decreasing in the quality of the other proposals. It is a
generalized version of the competition for attention that appeared in Cotton (2009). We
show in this alternative setting, a contest for attention leads the policymaker to become
fully informed about the optimal allocation.
We reserve the detailed consideration of other extensions for future research. These
include:
IG budget constraints–Assuming that IGs face binding budget constraints changes the
equilibrium outcomes. When all IGs face the same budget constraint, the constraint may
represent the implementation of campaign contribution limits as in Cotton (2009). An
asymmetric constraint may represent cash or borrowing constraints which may differ
across IGs. With budget constraints, an IG’s equilibrium payment strategy is no longer
strictly increasing in proposal quality, but rather strictly increasing in quality up to a
point, before jumping to the maximum budget. This implies that the policymaker will
fail to become fully informed about the quality of all proposals when more than k IGs
have high enough realizations of quality that they contribute their entire budget.
Unobservable IG asymmetries–When IG differences in v are unobservable, a policymaker
will be uncertain whether high contributions are due to IGs having high v or high pro-
posal quality. He will only learn the true quality of proposals he reviews, and will
remain less informed about the quality of the other proposals. This adds noise to the
policymaking process which we anticipate is similar to the extension with noisy IG qual-
ity signals.
IG have opposing positions on the same policy space–The model requires IGs to have some
uncertainty about the proposal quality of the other IGs. The model would apply in a
situation where the policymaker is deciding whether to eliminate steel tariffs, where the
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steel industry knows how many jobs the tariffs save in the steel industry, and manufac-
turers know how many manufacturing jobs the tariffs costs, but the opposing interests
have uncertainty about the effect of the tariffs on jobs in the other industry. Such a
situation is consistent with our framework. However, our framework is not consistent
with a situation where the opposing interests are fully informed about the policymaker’s
optimal policy on their issue. That is a different model that may be explored in future
research.
6. Conclusion
The paper shows how a policymaker who sells political access to interest groups based
on contributions may become fully informed about the quality of all policy proposals,
and be guaranteed to implement the best policy. This is the case when the policymaker
allocates his limited attention through a “contest for attention” before implementing
the proposals he believes are best. This result stands in contrast to popular intuition
that assumes the exchange of political contributions for access must be detrimental for
policy. We find exactly the opposite. Selling political access to the highest bidders can
guarantee the first best policy.
We establish that this main insight holds across a variety of assumptions and exten-
sions to the model. The result holds regardless of how constrained the policymaker is,
whether interest groups are symmetric or asymmetric, whether the contest for attention
involves an all-pay or winner-pay contest, and whether the policy proposals involve the
allocation of a non-divisible or divisible resource. Our analysis suggests that a contest
for attention can result in a fully informed policymaker and the first best policy in a
wide variety of settings.
The paper goes on to establish that in some settings, a contest for attention may result
in both the first best policy and the first best level of total contributions. When this
is the case, a policymaker does not need to sacrifice political contributions in order to
implement the best policy. This result is in contrast to numerous models of lobbying
in which a policymaker can bias policy in favor of interest groups in order to increase
political contributions. With a contest for attention, it is possible for a policymaker to
maximize both contribution and policy utility. When this is the case, it is impossible for
a policymaker to be better off in terms of either contributions or policy than when he
allocates attention to the highest bidder before implementing the proposals he believes
best.
Additional insights are gained when the analysis allows interest groups to differ in
terms of wealth or policy valuation, as well as proposal quality. In this setting, the
payment-maximizing contest for attention is handicapped to fully account for interest
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group asymmetries. A rich interest group must pay more than an otherwise similar poor
group for the same equilibrium probability of access (e.g., big oil must pay more than a
local community non profit). The result gives insight into the popular intuition that the
rich have better access to politicians, and that policy must therefore be biased in favor
of the rich. This is not true in our analysis. Although we find that rich interest groups
tend to contribute more than poor interest groups, this does not imply that the rich have
a higher probability of winning attention or having their proposals implemented. In
equilibrium, the policymaker devotes attention to and implements the highest quality
proposals. Under our assumptions about policymaker behavior, policy is independent
of interest group wealth.
Finally, the competition for attention framework may provide insight into other set-
tings beyond political lobbying. A contest for attention may improve allocation deci-
sions in other environments in which the primary goal is to choose the highest-quality
or most-qualified options, including the selection of candidates for jobs, scholarships,
admissions or marriage, and the selection of investment opportunities. We leave further
consideration of these and other applications to future research.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Throughout the proofs, we use “PM” in place of “policymaker.”
Lemma 1: The strict monotonicity of C¯∗i means there exists a one-to-one mapping be-
tween proposal i’s quality, qi, and the payment made by IGi, ci. If the PM reviews
proposal i, then he observes qi directly. If the PM does not review proposal i, then he in-
fers qi from his observation of ci anticipating the IGs’ equilibrium contribution strategy.
That is, he believes that qi = C¯∗−1i (ci), and given the one-to-one relationship between ci
and qi these beliefs are accurate in equilibrium. 
Lemma 2: The PM’s policy choice must be sequentially rational given his beliefs about
q, which means he must choose the policy with the highest posterior expected quality.
When the PM is fully informed, his beliefs are correct, and he implements the highest
quality proposal with probability one. 
Lemma 3: Follows from the analysis in the body of the paper. 
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Proposition 1: The analysis here complements the analysis in the body of the paper.
In the body, we show that EUi = B(Q¯∗(ci)) − ci for any ci ≤ C¯∗(qi). In equilibrium,
IGi must (weakly) prefer ci = C¯∗(qi) to any lower contribution, including a marginal
decrease in ci. The IG has no incentive to marginally decrease ci from its equilibrium
payment if ∂EUi/∂ci ≥ 0 when evaluated at ci = C¯∗(qi), meaning that IGi prefers to
increase his contribution to C¯∗(qi) from any value lower than but close enough to this
amount. This is the case when
∂EUi
∂ci
∣∣∣∣
ci=C¯∗(qi)
= B′ (Q¯∗(C¯∗(qi))) Q¯∗′(C¯∗(qi))− 1 ≥ 0. (9)
Note that Q¯∗(C¯∗(qi)) = qi and that 1/Q¯∗′(C¯∗(qi)) = C¯∗′(qi) is implied by Q¯∗ being the
inverse function of C¯∗. Therefore, (9) may be rewritten
C¯∗′(qi) ≤ B′ (qi) . (10)
In equilibrium, (10) must hold for each possible realization of qi ∈ Q. The requirement
that (10) holds for all qi implies that 1 ≤ B′(Q¯∗(ci))Q¯∗′(ci) for all ci ∈ (0, C¯∗(qmax)],
which guarantees that ∂EUi/∂ci ≥ 0 for all relevant ci. Therefore, (10) for all qi ∈ Q is
both a necessary and sufficient condition for an IG not to have an incentive to deviate
downward from its equilibrium contribution.
The rest of the existence argument follows from the analysis in the body of the paper.
The claim that no other symmetric full-information equilibria exist follows because the
analysis fully characterizes the set of strictly increasing contribution functions that corre-
spond to symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game. Because a full-information
equilibrium is defined as one in which all contribution functions are strictly increasing,
our characterization includes all symmetric full-information equilibria. 
Proposition 2: Follows from Prop. 1 and the definition of a payment-maximizing full-
information equilibrium as one in which all IGs contribute according to C∗i = B. 
Corollary 2: Suppose c∗ = {c∗1 , ..., c∗n} constitutes the equilibrium contribution profile
under any arbitrary mechanism for the PM choosing which policy to implement. Each
IG’s equilibrium contribution c∗i must satisfy an individual rationality constraint, c
∗
i ≤
pii(c∗)v, where pii(c∗) is the probability the PM chooses policy i conditional on equilib-
rium contribution profile c∗. The set of individual rationality constraints implies that
n
∑
i=1
c∗i ≤
n
∑
i=1
pii(c∗)v. (11)
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If the policymaker always chooses a policy (as he will in our game), then ∑ni=1 pii(c
∗) = 1.
Therefore, (11) simplifies to
n
∑
i=1
c∗i ≤ v. (12)
With the contest for attention, ex ante expected aggregate contributions equal v. As
(12) shows, no mechanism for choosing which policy to implement can result in higher
aggregate payments.
In a full-information equilibrium, the PM also implements the proposal that maxi-
mizes his policy payoff. Therefore, the equilibrium involves both the highest possible
payments and the best possible policy outcome, and the PM expects the maximum the-
oretically feasible payoff. 
Proposition 3: The analysis in the body of the paper establishes that no IG has an in-
centive to under contribute (i.e., pay ci < C¯∗(qi)) when C¯∗′(qi) ≤ B′(qi; m) for all qi > 0.
It also argues that no IG has an incentive to over contribute (i.e., pay ci > C¯∗(qi)) when
C¯∗′(qi) is sufficiently large, and that C∗ = B is always consistent with this requirement.
Here, we formally establish these components of the result. The body of the paper es-
tablishes that no IG has an incentive to over contribute when k = m; we therefore focus
on the case where k < m.
Consider the decision of IGi when all other IGs contribute according to strictly increas-
ing function C¯∗, and where k < m. IGi’s expected payoff from contribution ci ≥ C¯∗(qi)
is
v∑m−1y=0
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! F(qi)
n−1−y(1− F(qi))y
+ v∑n−1y=m
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! ∑
m−1
x=k
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qi)
n−1−y(F(Q∗(ci))− F(qi))y−x(1− F(Q∗(ci)))x
− ci.
(13)
The first line of (13) is v times the probability that fewer than m other proposals are
higher quality than proposal i. When proposal i is one of the m highest quality proposals
and ci ≥ C∗(qi), the PM will implement proposal i regardless of whether IGi wins
attention. If IGi wins attention, the PM observes qi and expects it to be one of the m
highest values. If i has one of the m highest quality proposals but does not win attention,
the group will still have submitted one of the m highest payments and will still have its
policy implemented. The second line of (13) is v times the probability that IGi does not
have one of the m highest quality proposals, but still has its policy implemented (i.e.,
submits one of the m highest payments but does not receive attention).
Notice that the first line of (13) equals B(qi; m) as given by (8).
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We can approach the analysis from the perspective of mechanism design. Under a
contest mechanism, IGs choose contributions conditional on the quality of their propos-
als. The Revelation Principle implies that we can model this choice as IGs announcing
their quality (possibly dishonestly), and being assigned a contribution amount given
their announcement according to their equilibrium payment function C∗. We denote
agent i’s announcement of its type by qˆi, which is equivalent to i choosing a contribution
ci and qˆi ≡ C∗i −1(ci). Equilibrium payment functions must be such that each IG prefers
to truthfully announce their quality, with qˆi = qi. This means that we can rewrite (13) in
terms of qˆi rather than ci.
B(qi; m)
+ v∑n−1y=m
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! ∑
m−1
x=k
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qi)
n−1−y(F(qˆi)− F(qi))y−x(1− F(qˆi))x
− C∗(qˆi).
(14)
Notice that when IGi truthfully announces qˆi (i.e., does not over contribute), the second
line of (14) equals zero, and its expected payoff is
B(qi; m)− C∗(qi). (15)
For IGi to prefer his equilibrium contribution to any higher contribution, (15) must be at
least as great as (14) for all qˆi > qi. And this must hold generally for all qi > 0 in order
for i never to have an incentive to deviate. (15) is at least as great as (14) if
v∑n−1y=m
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! ∑
m−1
x=k
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qi)
n−1−y(F(qˆi)− F(qi))y−x(1− F(qˆi))x
≤ C∗(qˆi)− C∗(qi).
(16)
This expression is satisfied for all qˆi > qi and every qi > 0 when C∗(qˆi) − C∗(qi) is
sufficiently large. Given that we focus on full-information equilibria where by definition
C∗′(qi) > 0, this condition requires that C∗′(qi) is sufficiently large for all qi. If (16) does
not hold, then IGi prefers to deviate to announce a value qˆi > qi (i.e., to contribute more
than C∗(qi)), violating the equilibrium strategy.
The above analysis verifies the claim that C∗′(qi) must be sufficiently large. Next, we
show that C∗ = B always satisfies this required equilibrium condition; C∗′(qi) = B′(qi)
is always sufficiently large. Expression (15), the expected utility to IGi of playing the
equilibrium strategy qˆi = qi, simplifies to B(qi; m)− B(qi; m) = 0. To establish that IGi
prefers qˆi = qi to any higher value, we must show that (16) always holds when C∗ = B.
First, we rewrite an expression for B(qi; m) in terms of both i’s true quality qi and some
arbitrary alternative q˜i < qi.
B(qi; m) = v∑m−1y=0
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! F(q˜i)
n−1−y(1− F(q˜i))y
+ v∑n−1y=m
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! ∑
m−1
x=0
y!
(y−x)!x! F(q˜i)
n−1−y(F(qi)− F(q˜i))y−x(1− F(qi))x
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When IGi exaggerates the quality of its proposal, it represents a quality qˆi greater than
qi. We may therefore write
B(qˆi; m) = v∑m−1y=0
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! F(qi)
n−1−y(1− F(qi))y
+ v∑n−1y=m
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! ∑
m−1
x=0
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qi)
n−1−y(F(qˆi)− F(qi))y−x(1− F(qˆi))x
(17)
Notice that the first line of this expression simply equals B(qi; m) from (8). Next, we
plug (17) and (8) into (16) for C∗(qˆi) = B(qˆi; m) and C∗(qi) = B(qi; m) respectively.
Simplifying the resulting expression allows us to rewrite (16):
v∑n−1y=m
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! ∑
m−1
x=k
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qi)
n−1−y(F(qˆi)− F(qi))y−x(1− F(qˆi))x
≤ v∑n−1y=m (n−1)!(n−1−y)!y! ∑m−1x=0
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qi)
n−1−y(F(qˆi)− F(qi))y−x(1− F(qˆi))x.
(18)
Inequality (18) strictly holds for all qˆi > qi, establishing that IGi prefers to announce
qˆi = qi any higher value. This equivalently means that IGi prefers ci = C∗(qi) to any
higher contribution. 
Proposition 4: It is straightforward to adapt the proof of Corollary 2 for the multiple
policy environment. 
Proposition 5: By definition, a full information equilibrium is one in which C∗′(qi) > 0
for all qi > 0. As we previously determined, in equilibrium the PM will implement the
proposals he believes are highest quality. His beliefs when he does not review proposal
i put probability 1 on qi = C∗−1(ci) ≡ Q∗(ci) for any ci on the domain of C∗.
Consider IGi’s optimization problem when the other n− 1 IGs contribute according
to equilibrium function C∗, and the PM reviews no proposals (relying only on observed
contributions when updating his beliefs). IGi’s expected payoff from contributing ci is
v∑m−1y=0
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! F(Q
∗(ci))n−1−y(1− F(Q∗(ci)))y − ci.
That is, when the PM reviews no proposals, the PM implements proposal i when contri-
bution ci signals one of the m highest qualities. Given that the other n− 1 IGs contribute
according to the equilibrium function, proposal i is implemented when fewer than m
other j 6= i give cj > ci, which happens whenever fewer than m others have qj > Q∗(ci).
Given the continuous distribution of qualities, ties happen with zero probability. (8)
means that this payoff is equivalent to
B(Q∗(ci); m)− ci. (19)
The derivative of (19) with respect to ci is positive if
B′(Q∗(ci); m)Q∗′(ci) ≥ 1.
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Given the definition of Q∗ ≡ C∗−1, we know 1/Q∗′(ci) = C∗(qi). Therefore we may
rewrite the previous inequality as
C∗′(qi) ≤ B′(qi; m) (20)
The analysis in support of Proposition 1 established that C∗′(qi) can be no greater than
B′(qi) for C∗ to be an equilibrium, guaranteeing that (20) is satisfied. Therefore, no full
information equilibrium exists in which C∗′(qi) < B′(qi; m) for any qi ∈ Q.
We must also show that there does not exist an equilibrium in which C∗i = B(·; m).
When this is the case, IGi is indifferent between all ci ∈ [0, B(qmax; m)]; any contribution
gives IGi an expected payoff of zero. A1 requires that an indifferent IG maximize the
probability of having its policy implemented. This probability is maximized at a value
of 1 when IGi submits the maximum feasible contribution, ci = B(qmax; m). For all qi <
qmax, A1 means that IGi over contributes since B(qi; m) = C∗i (qi) < ci = B(qmax; m). 
Other proofs and analysis of the extensions can be found in the Online Appendix.
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Appendix B. Online Appendix for “Competing for Attention”
by Christopher Cotton
This document works through the extensions found in my article, “Competing for
Attention.” It includes the following sections:
B.1. Reviewing additional proposals – Extends Section 3 of the paper to allow the
policymaker to review more proposals than he can implement.
B.2. Asymmetric IGs in a symmetric contest – Incorporates IG asymmetries into the
analysis, and then considers a symmetric contest for attention, where those who
make the highest payment receive attention.
B.3. Asymmetric contests for attention – Considers asymmetric contests for attention,
which can adjust payments to account for agent asymmetries.
B.4. Winner-pay contests – Assumes that only those who win attention pay their bids.
B.5. Other methods for allocating attention – A discussion of alternative access alloca-
tion mechanisms.
B.6. Alternative assumptions on indifferent contributors – Considers alternatives to
assumption A1.
B.7. Noisy quality signals – Discusses the case in which IGs only observe noise signals
of how the policymaker will interpret the evidence.
B.8. Allocating a divisible resource – Assumes that the policymaker chooses how to
split a divisible resource rather than allocate a finite set of non-divisible prizes.
B.1. Reviewing additional proposals. The results in Section 3.4 apply to the case where
the policymaker reviews no more proposals than he can implement. In that section when
the other players choose equilibrium strategies, an IG needs to submit one of the m
highest payments to have a chance of its policy being implemented. This is a necessary
condition, and if an IG did not do so, the policymaker would not review the group’s
proposal, and would not expect that the proposal was worth implementing.
In this section, we consider the alternative possibility that the policymaker reviews
more proposals than he implements, i.e., 1 ≤ m < k < n. Here, an IG no longer
needs to submit one of the m highest contributions for the possibility of having its policy
implemented. The IG only needs to submit one of the k > m highest payments; although
it must still have one of the m highest qualities, as the quality of the k highest-payment
proposals will be revealed during the review process. This increases the incentive IGs
have to decrease their contributions. Although full-information equilibria continue to
exist, they require that C∗′(qi) is not too high. This incentive undermines the existence
of the payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium, and when k > m, no such
equilibrium exists.
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The main result—that the policymaker can guarantee the first best policy by selling
attention to the highest bidder—continues to hold when the policymaker reviews more
proposals than he can implement. However, reviewing additional proposals eliminates
the existence of the payment-maximizing equilibrium, and can thus undermine the pol-
icymaker’s rent seeking efforts. When the policymaker reviews more proposals than he
can implement, there does not exist a full-information equilibrium that fully extracts IG
rent; no payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium exists.
Proposition 7. In the contest for attention where 1 ≤ m < k < n, there exists a function C˜
such that
i. 0 < C˜′(qi) for all qi ∈ Q, and
ii. for all functions C¯ such that 0 < C¯′(qi) < C˜′(qi) for all qi ∈ Q and C¯(0) = 0, there
exists a full-information equilibrium in which C∗i = C¯ for each i = N .
There does not exist a payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the decision of IGi when all other IGs contribute according to strictly
increasing function C¯∗, and where m < k. IGi’s expected payoff from contribution
ci ≤ C¯∗(qi) is
v∑m−1y=0
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! F(Q
∗(ci))n−1−y(1− F(Q∗(ci)))y
+ v∑k−1y=m
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! ∑
m−1
x=0
y!
(y−x)!x! F(Q
∗(ci))n−1−y(F(qi)− F(Q∗(ci)))y−x(1− F(qi))x
− ci.
(21)
The first line of (21) is v times the probability that fewer than m other proposals submit
higher payments than ci. This means that fewer than m other IGs have qj > Q∗(ci),
and by extension have qj < qi since Q∗(ci) ≤ qi given our focus on the case of under
contributing where ci ≤ C¯∗(qi). The first line is equivalent to B(qˆi; m). The second line of
(21) is v times the probability that IGi has does not submit one of the m highest payments
but is still reviewed (i.e., still submits one of the k highest payments) and is revealed to
have one of the m highest quality proposals.
As in the proof to Prof. 3 in the body of the paper, we can approach the analysis from
the perspective of mechanism design, where the Revelation Principal implies that we
can model this choice as IGs announcing their quality (allowing for possible dishonesty),
and being assigned a contribution amount given their announcement according to their
equilibrium payment function C∗. We denote agent i’s announcement of its type by
qˆi, which is equivalent to i choosing a contribution ci and qˆi ≡ C∗i −1(ci). Equilibrium
payment functions must be such that each IG prefers to truthfully announce its quality,
with qˆi = qi. This means that we can rewrite (21) in terms of qˆi rather than ci.
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B(qˆi; m) + v∑k−1y=m
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! ∑
m−1
x=0
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qˆi)
n−1−y(F(qi)− F(qˆi))y−x(1− F(qi))x
− C¯∗(qˆi).
(22)
If IGi announces qˆi = qi, this simplifies to
B(qi; m)− C¯∗(qi). (23)
Equation B in terms of true quality qi may be expanded:
B(qi; m) = B(qˆi; m) +
v∑n−1y=m
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! ∑
m−1
x=0
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qˆi)
n−1−y(F(qi)− F(qˆi))y−x(1− F(qi))x.
(24)
Therefore, (23) is greater than (22) if
v∑k−1y=m
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! ∑
m−1
x=0
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qˆi)
n−1−y(F(qi)− F(qˆi))y−x(1− F(qi))x − C¯∗(qˆi)
≤ v∑n−1y=m (n−1)!(n−1−y)!y! ∑m−1x=0
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qˆi)
n−1−y(F(qi)− F(qˆi))y−x(1− F(qi))x − C¯∗(qi).
(25)
Or, equivalently
C¯∗(qi)− C¯∗(qˆi)
≤ v∑n−1y=k (n−1)!(n−1−y)!y! ∑m−1x=0
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qˆi)
n−1−y(F(qi)− F(qˆi))y−x(1− F(qi))x.
(26)
The probability the PM implements proposal i is increasing in all qˆi < qi. Condition (25)
holds as long as the increased payment associated with truthfully announcing quality is
lower than the increase in expected policy payoff from doing so. This will be the case as
long as C¯∗′(qi) is sufficiently low for all qi.
Suppose C¯∗ is such that C¯∗(0) = 0 and C¯∗′(qi) is positive but approaching zero for all
qi. Then (26) is certainly satisfied. This guarantees that such an equilibrium contribution
function exists. Therefore, there exists a function C˜ such that C˜′(qi) > 0 for all qi, and
for each C¯ such that 0 < C¯′(qi) < C˜′(qi) for each qi and C¯(0) = 0 there exists a full
revelation equilibrium in which C∗i = C¯ for each i.
Next, we show that there does not exist a payment-maximizing full-information equi-
librium. Such an equilibrium requires C∗i = B for all i. This implies (21) simplifies
to
v∑k−1y=m
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! ∑
m−1
x=0
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qˆi)
n−1−y(F(qi)− F(qˆi))y−x(1− F(qi))x (27)
and (23) simplifies to 0. For qˆi < qi, (27) is positive, meaning that IGi receives a higher
expected payoff from qˆi < qi than it does from qˆi = qi, a contradiction. Therefore, no
equilibrium exists in which C∗i = B for all i. 
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B.2. Symmetric contest for attention with asymmetric IGs. The main results for asym-
metric IGs will come in the next section where we consider a handicapped contest. In
this section, we show that when differences between IGs are not too large, a policymaker
may still become fully informed if he sells attention to the highest bidder.
Proposition 8. Consider the game with asymmetric IGs and a symmetric contest for attention,
and where 1 ≤ k ≤ m < n. If the IGs are sufficiently similar, then there exists a full-information
equilibrium in which C∗i = Bn for all i = 1, ..., n. There does not exist a symmetric payment-
maximizing full-information equilibrium.
Following the same argument as in the previous sections, one can show that no IGi
has an incentive to under-contribute compared to the symmetric full-information equi-
librium strategy when C¯∗′(qi) ≤ B′i(qi) for all qi ∈ Q. The symmetric equilibrium
strategy C¯∗ must satisfy this constraint for all i ∈ N . Because the constraint is most
restrictive for IGn (one can show that for any qi, B′i(qi) > B
′
j(qi) when i < j), it must
be that C¯∗′(qi) ≤ B′n(qi) for all qi ∈ Q. This means there cannot exist a symmetric
full-information equilibrium that offers higher expected contributions than one in which
C¯∗ = Bn.
When k = m no IGi ever has an incentive to over-contribute, and when k < m no
IGi has an incentive to over-contribute as long as C¯∗′(qi) is sufficiently steep. For any
individual IGi, these constraints are guaranteed to be satisfied as long as C¯∗′(qi) is suf-
ficiently close to B′i(qi) for all qi ∈ Q. The steepest feasible symmetric contribution
function (such that no IG has an incentive to under-contribute), C¯∗ = Bn, satisfies this
constraint for all i ∈ N as long as Bn is sufficiently similar to Bi (i.e., when vi is suffi-
ciently close to vn).
In the game where IGs differ in vi, and where the policymaker reviews the proposals
with the highest ci, there does not exist an equilibrium in which C∗i = Bi for all i. In the
game with asymmetric IGs, the policymaker cannot maximize payments by awarding
attention to the highest bidders.
Proof to Proposition 8: As in the proofs to Prop. 3 and 5, we continue to rely on the rev-
elation principle in solving the problem. This approach means that each IG announces
its quality qˆi, and the equilibrium payment functions C∗i must be each IG prefers to an-
nounce quality truthfully, qˆi = qi. The proof to Prop. 3 establishes that (16) must hold for
each qˆi ≥ qi and all qi ∈ Q. When IGs differ in terms of their vi, this condition becomes
vi ∑n−1y=m
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! ∑
m−1
x=k
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qi)
n−1−y(F(qˆi)− F(qi))y−x(1− F(qˆi))x
≤ C∗(qˆi)− C∗(qi),
(28)
where C∗ is the equilibrium contribution function shared by all IGs. Following the proof
to Prop. 3, one can also show that the left hand side of this expression is strictly less
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than Bi(qi; m). For the same reason as in the earlier proofs, this implies that there exists
a function C˜i where 0 ≤ C˜′i(qi) < B′i(qi; m) for all qi ∈ Q, and such that for each C¯ such
that C˜′i(qi) < C¯
′(qi) ≤ B′i(qi; m) and C¯(0) = 0 it is a best response for IGi to contribute
according to C¯ whenever the n− 1 other IGs also contribute according to C¯.
For there to exist a full-information equilibrium in which C∗i = Bn for each i, it must
be that
vi ∑n−1y=m
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! ∑
m−1
x=k
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qi)
n−1−y(F(qˆi)− F(qi))y−x(1− F(qˆi))x
≤ vn ∑n−1y=m (n−1)!(n−1−y)!y! ∑m−1x=0
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qi)
n−1−y(F(qˆi)− F(qi))y−x(1− F(qˆi))x.
(29)
The right hand side of this expression comes from substituting in for C∗(qi) = Bn(qi; m)
and C∗(qˆi) = Bn(qˆi; m) while recognizing that when qˆi > qi, Bn(qˆi; m) may be written as:
Bn(qˆi; m) = Bn(qi; m) +
vn ∑n−1y=m
(n−1)!
(n−1−y)!y! ∑
m−1
x=0
y!
(y−x)!x! F(qi)
n−1−y(F(qˆi)− F(qi))y−x(1− F(qˆi))x.
(30)
Remember that v1 > v2 > ... < vn. Therefore, if (29) holds for IG1, it will also hold for
all other IGs. The probability represented by the summation on the left hand side of (29)
is strictly less than the probability represented by the summation on the right hand side
of the same inequality. Therefore, (29) holds for all IGs as long as v1 is sufficiently close
to vn. When v1 is sufficiently close to vn that (29) is satisfied, there exists an equilibrium
in which all IGs contribute according to C∗i = Bn.
Next, we rule out the existence of a payment-maximizing, full-information equilib-
rium, which by definition requires C∗i = Bi for all i. Notice that for any qi ∈ Q,
Bi(qi; m) > Bj(qi; m) if and only if i < j (i.e., iff vi > vj), and therefore B1(qmax; m) >
Bi(qmax; m) for all i 6= 1. Consider the contribution decision of IG1 given that the other
n− 1 IGs contribute according to C∗i = Bi. This means that if IG1 submits any payment
c1 ≥ Bk+1(qmax; m), then with probability one c1 is one of the k highest payments and
the PM reviews and directly observes q1. Thus, submitting any c1 ≥ Bk+1(qmax; m) guar-
antees that the PM implements policy 1 if and only if it is one of the m highest quality
proposals. Increasing a payment greater than Bk+1(qmax, m) imposes greater costs on the
IG, but does not change the probability the PM implements the IG’s proposal. Therefore,
IG1 expected payoff is strictly decreasing in its contributions when c1 > Bk+1(qmax; m),
and IG1 strictly prefers to contribute ci = Bk+1(qmax; m) to any higher value.
Define q¯ as the IG1 quality realization that solves B1(q¯; m) = Bk+1(qmax; m). A payment-
maximizing full-information equilibrium requires that C∗1 (q1) = B1(q1; m). We know
B1(q1; m) > Bk+1(qmax; m) for all q1 ∈ (q¯, qmax], contradicting the finding in the pre-
vious paragraph that the maximum feasible contribution by IG1 cannot exceed c1 =
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Bk+1(qmax; m). Therefore, no payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium exists
when the PM reviews the proposals associated with the highest payments. 
B.3. Model with Asymmetric Interest Groups. In Section 3, we consider a version of
the game in which IGs differ only in the realized quality of their proposals. In real-
ity, IGs differ in their benefit from having their proposal implemented, or opportunity
costs of providing political contributions. In this section, we allow for such observable
asymmetries between the IGs.27 Except for the following changes, the underlying setting
remains identical to the previous sections.
The IGs’ payoffs depend on whether their proposal is implemented and their pay-
ment: ui(pi, ci) = vi pi − ci. Parameter vi represents the relative value IGi puts on policy
outcomes relative to payments. A higher vi may be interpreted as either IGi having more
at stake from their proposal being implemented, or as i being more wealthy or having
lower costs of funds.28 Without loss of generality, we rank order IGs according to their
value, such that v1 > v2 > ... > vn.29
The policymaker reviews k and then implements m proposals, where 1 ≤ k ≤ m < n.
The expected benefit to IGi if the policymaker always implements the m highest-quality
proposals is thus
Bi(qi; m) = vi
m−1
∑
y=0
(n− 1)!
(n− 1− y)!y! (1− F(qi))
yF(qi)n−1−y. (31)
Here, Bi(·; m) differs from B(·; m) in (8) only in the IG specific value vi. Where clear, we
refer to Bi(·; m) by Bi. Given that v1 ≥ ... ≥ vn, it follows that Bn(qi) ≤ Bi(qi) for all i and
qi > 0; the benefit to IGn from participating in a full-information equilibrium is lower
than the benefit to any other IG.
The Online Appendix provides an analysis of a symmetric contest for attention in this
environment. In such a contest, an IG wins attention when it provides one of the k high-
est payments. In that environment, as long as IGs are not too different, the policymaker
becomes fully informed and implements the first best policy in equilibrium. However,
27Throughout the paper, we continue to assume that the quality of all proposals is drawn from the same
distribution F. It is straightforward to extend the model to assume a different distribution for each IG.
However, doing so is extremely tedious, notationally, without providing any additional insight.
28To see this, suppose that IG i receives payoffs uˆi = vˆi − τibi when its policy is implemented and uˆi =
−τˆibi when it is not implemented. Here, vˆi is the weight on policy and τˆi is the weight on payments. Any
positive affine transformation of uˆi maintains preferences. We therefore define vi ≡ vˆi/τˆi and ui ≡ uˆi/τˆ,
and rewrite agent i’s preferences as we defined them in the body of the paper. An increase in vˆi and a
decrease in τˆi are indistinguishable in the model.
29The analysis considers IG differences in vi. Additionally, we could incorporate differences in quality
distribution, Fi, allowing IGs to, for example, differ in the expected quality of their proposals. Allowing
such differences complicates the analysis, particularly the functions for Bi, without providing additional
insight. The main results continue to hold.
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we can show that such a contest is not optimal for a policymaker who also cares about
contributions. In the following analysis, we allow for more general asymmetric (i.e.,
“handicapped”) contest for attention, which requires greater payments from some IGs
than from others for the same equilibrium probability of winning attention. We show
how such a contest is optimal for the policymaker compared to any other method that
guarantees the first best policy.
We generalize the concept of “contests for attention” to allow for an asymmetric con-
test. A contest for attention is modeled as an asymmetric all-pay contest defined as a
set of score functions θ = {θ1, ..., θn}, one for each IG. When IGi provides payment ci,
its “score” is given by θi(ci), where θi(0) = 0 and θ′i(ci) > 0 for all ci > 0. The pro-
posals associated with the highest scores in the contests receive attention. That is, the
policymaker reviews proposal i if fewer than k other proposals have θj(cj) > θi(ci).
Up until now, the analysis has considered a symmetric contest for attention in which
the policymaker reviews the proposals of the IGs that provide the highest payments. This
situation is captured by the generalized contest structure when θi = θj for i, j = 1, ..., n.
A general function θi allows the contest for attention to take into account individual
IG characteristics, including differences in vi. In this way, the score functions allow for
the handicapping of the contest, requiring different payments from different IGs for the
same expected probability of winning attention.
In this section, we consider a specific version of the handicapped contest for attention,
where in equilibrium the score functions fully adjust for the observable IG asymmetries.
Specifically, the analysis focuses on a contest in which
θi(ci) = B−1i (ci) for all ci > 0.
IGi’s score function equals the inverse of its potential-benefit function, Bi.30 These score
functions mean that IGi wins attention when fewer than k other IGs make payments
such that B−1j (cj) > B
−1
i (ci).
We show that the payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium (e.g., where C∗i =
Bi for all i = 1, .., n) exists in this environment. Following the notation established
in the earlier sections, we define Q∗i ≡ C∗−1i , where Q∗i (ci) is the quality of proposal
i that results in equilibrium contribution ci. Therefore when C∗i = Bi, it follows that
Q∗i (ci) = B
−1
i (ci).
For the payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium to be an equilibrium of the
game, contributing according to C∗i = Bi must be a best response for each IGi given that
the other IGs contribute according to the equilibrium strategies. Given the equilibrium
strategies of the other IGs, IGi wins attention if its contest score B−1i (ci) is one of the k
30Notice that function B is strictly increasing in qi and is therefore invertible.
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highest. The contest scores of the other n− 1 IGs playing according to C∗i = Bi are given
by B−1j (C
∗
j (qj)) = B
−1
j (Bj(qj)) = qj. Therefore, IGi wins attention whenever fewer than
k other IGs have qj > Q∗i (ci). Recognizing this greatly simplifies the analysis. It means
that the incentives that IGi has to deviate from the equilibrium payment function and
submit either a higher or lower payment are similar to its incentives in the symmetric
game in Section 3.4.
First, consider IGi’s incentive to overpay, submitting a contribution ci > C∗i (qi). If
k = m, then overpaying is never beneficial, as there is no possibility for IGi to have
its proposal implemented without review (which is necessary for the group to benefit
from using its payment to signal a higher quality proposal than it actually has). If
k < m, then there is the possibility that in equilibrium the policymaker implements a
proposal without first reviewing it, and the IG may benefit from overpaying, inflating the
policymaker’s beliefs about its proposal’s quality in the absence of review. As was also
true in Section 3.4, it must be sufficiently costly to signal a marginally higher quality;
C∗′i (qi) must not be too low. This requirement is always satisfied when C
∗
i = Bi.
Next, consider IGi’s incentive to underpay, submitting a contribution ci < C∗i (qi).
Similar to previous sections, for IGi not to underpay, we require C∗′i (qi) ≤ B′i(qi) for all
qi > 0. If this is not the case, then for at least some realizations of qi, IGi benefits from
contributing less than the equilibrium payment; the costs associated with a lower prob-
ability of having its proposal implemented are dominated by the cost savings associated
with a lower payment.
The equilibrium payment function C∗i = B
∗
i satisfies these constraints and is therefore
a best response for IGi. In equilibrium, the IG strictly prefers to contribute according to
the equilibrium function rather than overpay, and weakly prefers to contribute according
to the equilibrium function rather than underpay. The indifference between contributing
to the equilibrium payment function and paying less is a consequence of the payment-
maximizing full-information equilibrium, in which the policymaker extracts all rent from
the policymaking process.
Proposition 9. Consider the game with asymmetric IGs and a handicapped contest for attention
in which θi = B−1i for all i, and where 1 ≤ k ≤ m < n. There exists a full-information
equilibrium in which C∗i = Bi for all i = 1, ..., n. This is the unique payment-maximizing
full-information equilibrium.
Proof: We consider the existence of a payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium
when the contest for attention handicaps bidders using contest score functions in which
θi = B−1i for each i. In such an equilibrium, IGi contributes ci = C
∗
i (qi) = Bi(qi; m),
and the contest assigns it a score θi(ci) = B−1i (ci). Substituting ci = Bi(qi; m) into the
score function gives θi(ci) = B−1i (Bi(qi; m)) = qi. This means that in equilibrium, the PM
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reviews the k highest quality proposals. Once this is established, the rest of the proof
follows from the earlier analysis.
Consider IGi’s contribution decision when the other n − 1 IGs contribute according
to their equilibrium payment functions. The PM reviews proposal i if and only if its
contribution ci is sufficiently high that fewer than k other IGs have qj > Q∗i (ci). This
means that IGi’s optimization problem is identical to the optimization problem consid-
ered in the Prop. 3 analysis with one exception: v, B and Q∗ must be replaced with IG
specific vi, Bi and Q∗i in the equations. Otherwise the analysis is unchanged. We can
therefore conclude C∗ constitutes an equilibrium if for each i and qi ∈ Q, C∗i is such that
C∗′i (qi) is not too small and C
∗′
i ≤ B∗′i (qi). Just as in the earlier section, C∗i = Bi always
satisfies the requirement that C∗′i (qi) not be too small. Therefore, there exists an equilib-
rium in which C∗i = Bi for each i. By definition, this is the unique payment-maximizing
full-information equilibrium. 
In equilibrium, the contest for attention’s score functions fully adjust for IG asymme-
tries, and in equilibrium the contest awards attention to the k highest-quality proposals.
IGs with higher vi tend to pay more than IGs with lower vi, implying higher contribu-
tions from more-wealthy groups or groups with more to gain from having their proposal
implemented. This does not, however, translate into either the attention or implementa-
tion decisions being biased in favor of more-wealthy IGs. In equilibrium, more-wealthy
groups pay more, but the contest accounts for observable differences between IGs, and
in equilibrium only the highest quality IGs (regardless of wealth) gain attention and have
their proposals implemented.
Corollary 3. Consider the game with asymmetric IGs and a handicapped contest for attention
in which θi = B−1i for all i, and where 1 ≤ k ≤ m < n. In equilibrium, wealthy IGs tend
to contribute more than less wealthy IGs, but they are no more likely to have their proposals
implemented and are no better off than less wealthy IGs.
When IGs differ only in proposal quality, a policymaker who cares about both col-
lecting payments and proposal quality can be no better off than when he sells attention
to the highest bidders before implementing the proposals he believes best. This pro-
cedure for implementing policy results in the first best total payment (equal to mv in
expectation) and the first best policy outcome. It no longer guarantees the first best
total payment in the environment with asymmetric IGs. In this section, the payment-
maximizing full-information equilibrium guarantees the first best policy outcome, and
guarantees the highest possible payments compared to any other full-information equi-
librium. But, it no longer guarantees the highest payments compared to certain methods
of selling policy. For example, the policymaker could make a take it or leave it offer to
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the m highest value IGs, committing to implement IGi’s proposal if and only if ci = vi
for i = 1, ..., m. It is an equilibrium under such an alternative mechanism for the m
highest value IGs to contribute ci = vi, and such a mechanism results in the maxi-
mum feasible expected sum of payments. It does not, however, guarantee the first best
policy outcome. The payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium describes the
most-profitable outcome associated with any mechanism that guarantees the first best
policy outcome. A contest for attention that results in this outcome is preferred to any
other method of awarding policy, as long as the policymaker cares enough about policy
relative to payments (as long as λ in his payoff function is not too small).
B.4. Awarding attention through a winner-pay auction. We model the contest for at-
tention as an all-pay auction, where all IGs pay their contributions regardless of whether
they win attention. In this section, we show that the policymaker may still be fully
informed and guaranteed to implement the first best policy if he uses a winner-pay
auction to award attention. However, we also establish that no payment-maximizing
full-information equilibrium exists. This means that potential revenue is higher when
the contest for attention takes the form of an all pay contest rather than a winner pay
contest.
In this section, we return to the initial setting we considered in Section 3, where IGs
differ only in their proposal quality (e.g., vi = v) and where the policymaker reviews and
implements one proposal (i.e., k = m = 1). Rather than the all-pay contest in Section 3,
here each IG submits a bid, ci, but only the IG that wins attention (i.e., the high bidder)
pays its bid. We consider the existence of a full-information equilibrium in which all
IGs bid according to a strictly increasing bid function C¯∗. If each IGi bids ci = C¯∗(qi),
then the policymaker will have correct beliefs about the quality of all proposals, and
the IG with the highest quality proposal will win attention, pay its bid, and have its
proposal implemented. As before, define Q¯∗(ci) = C¯∗−1(ci), the quality implied by bid
ci in equilibrium.
For similar reasons as in the earlier section, an IG has no incentive to overbid compared
to its equilibrium bid. By overbidding, IGi increases the probability that it wins attention
(i.e., is reviewed and has to pay its bid), but does not increase the probability that its
proposal is eventually implemented. Regardless of whether IGi bids ci = C¯∗(qi) or
some higher amount, it’s policy is eventually implemented with probability F(qi)n−1.
Therefore, given that k = m = 1, all IGs prefer ci = C¯∗(qi) to any higher bid.
IGs also must have no incentive to underbid compared to equilibrium. If IGi under-
bids, it expects payoff is
EUi = F(Q¯∗(ci))n−1
(
v− ci
)
, (32)
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which differs from (5) in Section 3 in that the IG pays its bid only if it wins attention. For
any realization qi, IGi must prefer to bid ci = C¯∗(qi) rather than a lower amount. This is
true when (32) is increasing in ci for all potential ci:
∂EUi
∂ci
= (n− 1)F(Q¯∗(ci))n−2 f (Q¯∗(ci))Q¯∗′(ci)
(
v− ci
)− F(Q¯∗(ci))n−1 ≥ 0. (33)
The expression is easier to interpret if we rewrite it in terms of the equilibrium bid
function C¯∗, noting that strict monotonicity of the bid function implies that C¯∗(qi) =
1/Q¯∗(ci). Inequality (33) holds for all ci < C¯∗(qi) and all possible qi if the following
expression holds for all qi ∈ Q:
(n− 1)F(qi)n−2 f (qi)
(
v− C¯∗(qi)
)− F(qi)n−1C¯∗′(qi) ≥ 0. (34)
Notice that the strategy associated with the payment-maximizing equilibrium from the
all-pay contest, C¯∗(qi) = B(qi), does not satisfy (34), and therefore cannot be an equilib-
rium. Consider instead the alternative strategy
C¯∗(qi) =
v
2
F(qi)n−1. (35)
When this is the equilibrium strategy, (34) simplifies to F(qi)n−1 ≤ 1, implying that the
equilibrium condition is satisfied, and the payment function given by (35) constitutes a
full-information equilibrium of the winner pay contest for attention game. The following
proposition states the result more generally.
Proposition 10. Consider the winner pay contest for attention. For any function C¯ that satisfies
(34), C¯(0) = 0, and 0 < C¯′(qi) for all qi ∈ Q, there exists a full-information equilibrium in
which C∗i = C¯ for each i = 1, ..., n. No other symmetric full-information equilibrium exists.
Proof. Existence follows from the analysis in the body of the paper. The claim that
no other symmetric full-information equilibria exist follows because the analysis fully
characterizes the set of strictly increasing contribution functions that correspond to sym-
metric Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game. Because a full-information equilibrium
is defined as one in which all contribution functions are strictly increasing, our charac-
terization includes all symmetric full-information equilibria. 
Notice that the maximum possible payment in a full-information equilibrium of the
winner-pay contest is necessarily lower than the total expected payment in the payment-
maximizing full-information equilibrium of the all-pay contest for attention. The sum
of expected payments in the all-pay contest equal v. In order to achieve total payments
equal to v in the winner-pay contest, the high bidder would always need to bid v. This
is not possible in a full-information equilibrium, in which payment functions must be
strictly increasing in proposal quality.
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B.5. Other methods for allocating attention. In this section, we discuss a number of
alternative methods for allocating the review slots. Consider first the possibility that the
policymaker allocate attention randomly, independent of any payment, before imple-
menting the proposals he believes best. In this case, IGs have no incentive to contribute,
and in equilibrium the policymaker will become fully informed about the quality of the
k proposals he chooses to review, but will remain fully uninformed about the quality of
the other proposals. This will also be the case if the policymaker allocates the review
slot based on some other observable characteristic. In equilibrium, he will collect no
payments and will not be certain of implementing the best proposals.
Alternatively, the policymaker could sell access but through a different method than
an auction or contest. For example, the policymaker could announce a fixed price, and
review up to k proposals with IG payments equal to their access price. In equilibrium of
this alternative environment, there exists a cut value q¯i for each IG, with IGi willing to
pay the access price only if qi ≥ q¯i. When this is the case, the policymaker remains only
partially informed about the proposals he does not review, inferring only whether qi
was greater than or less than q¯i. He is not guaranteed to implement the highest-quality
proposals.31
In our framework, the only interaction between the IGs and policymaker prior to the
policymaker choosing which proposals to review involves political contributions. Al-
ternatively, IGs may be able to send cheap talk messages to the policymaker prior to
the policymaker awarding attention. Here, we consider whether cheap talk, in the ab-
sence of payments, can guarantee the first best policy allocation. When k < m, it is not
possible to eliminate payments and maintain a full-information equilibrium. However,
when k ≥ m, there exists a full-information equilibrium of a game in which each IG
announces its type qˆi, and the policymaker reviews the k ≥ m proposals associated with
the highest announced quality. Because an IG will always have its proposal reviewed
(and its quality verified) before it is implemented, no IG has an incentive to deviate
from announcing qˆi = qi. The groups are indifferent between announcing qˆi truthfully
or exaggerating their quality. Although the full-information equilibrium exists, it is not
robust to a number of refinements. Trembling-hand perfection, for example, eliminates
the full-information equilibrium and results in a unique equilibrium in which all IGs
announce the highest possible qˆi = qmax. This is because an IG strictly prefers to exag-
gerate its quality when there is even a very small probability that other IGs exaggerate
theirs. Under such equilibrium refinements, no full-information equilibrium exists in a
game with cheap talk rather than payments.
31Cotton (2012) considers access prices in a model with two IGs and a binary quality structure. Cotton
(2013) models submission fees in academic publishing, which play a similar role as access prices would
play in our lobbying framework.
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B.6. Alternative assumption on indifferent contributors. Here, we consider an alterna-
tive to A1 in the game with symmetric IGs. We assume that indifferent IGs choose the
strategies that minimize payments, rather than one that maximizes the expected value
of the policy outcome.
A2 An IG that is indifferent between alternative strategies limits attention to the strat-
egy associated with the minimum contribution.
Under this alternative assumption, we find that nearly the entire range of full-information
equilibria identified in Proposition 3 continue to exist. The one exception is the payment-
maximizing full-information equilibrium in which C∗i = B for all i ∈ N . However, there
does exist a full-information equilibrium in which the outcome is nearly identical to
the payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium, and we show that this equilib-
rium results in just at least as high of policymaker payoffs compared to any alternative
method of implementing policy.
The assumption restricts the behavior of an IG only when it is indifferent between
its equilibrium contribution and other contributions. For equilibria in which C∗′i (qi) <
B′(qi) for all i and qi ∈ Q, choosing ci = C∗i (qi) is the unique best response for each
i when the other IGs also contribute according to C∗. In this case, A1 and A2 play no
roll. For equilibria in which C∗i = B, however, IGi is indifferent between ci = C
∗
i (qi)
and any lower contribution. Here, A1 requires that IGi choose ci = C∗i (qi), the max-
imum payment over which i is indifferent. Such behavior is perfectly consistent with
equilibrium. Contrast this with A2, which in this case requires IGi to choose ci = 0,
the minimum payment over which i is indifferent. Therefore, A2 requires IG behavior
that is not consistent with an equilibrium in which C∗i (qi) = B(qi) > 0. Under A2, no
payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium exists. We restate Proposition 3 given
A2.
Proposition 11. Assume A2 and consider the contest for attention game with k review slots and
m implemented proposals, where 1 ≤ k ≤ m < n. There exists a function C˜ such that
i. 0 ≤ C˜′(qi) < B′(qi; m) for all qi ∈ Q, and
ii. for all functions C¯ such that C˜′(qi) < C¯′(qi) < B′(qi; m) for all qi ∈ Q and C¯(0) = 0,
there exists a full information equilibrium in which C∗i = C¯ for each i = 1, ..., n.
There does not exist a payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium.
Proof: Follows from the proof to Prop. 3 and recognizing that A2 requires that ci = 0
when C∗ = B.
The key difference between this result and the earlier result is that under A2, there
does not exist an equilibrium in which C∗i = B for all i. This means that no payment-
maximizing full-information equilibrium exists. However, there does exist a full-information
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equilibrium in which the outcome is nearly identical to the payment-maximizing full-
information equilibrium. This is the case when the equilibrium strategies C∗i are nearly
equal to B; that is, when C∗′i (qi) is less than, but nearly equal to B
′(qi; m) for all i and
qi ∈ Q. No other method for choosing which proposals to implement will result in
higher payoffs for the policymaker than he earns in this equilibrium of the contest for
attention. The following proposition adapts Proposition 4 to account for A2.
Proposition 12. Assume A2 and consider the contest for attention game with k review slots and
m implemented proposals, where 1 ≤ k ≤ m < n. There exists a full-information equilibrium
that results in at least as high of expected policymaker payoffs as any alternative method for
choosing which proposals to implement.
Proof. Under A2, there does not exist an equilibrium in which C∗i = B for all i. This
means that no payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium exists. However, there
does exist a full-information equilibrium in which the outcome is nearly identical to
the payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium. This is the case C∗i is such that
C∗′i (qi) is less than, but nearly equal to B
′(qi; m) for all i and qi ∈ Q. This is a full
information equilibrium, meaning that the PM is guaranteed to implement the first best
policy outcome.
This means no other method for choosing which policies to implement results in
higher policy utility. Next, we establish that no other method results in higher pay-
ments. The highest payment equilibrium of the contest for attention under A2 results
in expected total contributions only marginally less than mv. This means that only a
method for implementing policy under which total payments at least equal to mv leads
to higher contributions than the contest for attention. It is straightforward to adapt the
proof of Corollary 2 to show that without any restriction on the behavior of indifferent
IGs (or under assumption A1), the maximum payment is mv. Under A2, however, no
such mechanism in which total payments are mv is feasible. This is because total ex-
pected payments of mv require that payments fully transfer any rent from IGs to the
PM, leaving the IGs with payoff of zero. A2 requires that any IG contributes the lowest
payment over which it is indifferent, which in this case is a payment of ci = 0, which
also guarantees a payoff of zero. Therefore, total expected payments of mv is not feasible
under A2, and the maximum possible expected total payments are marginally less than
mv. Therefore, the contest for attention leads to the highest feasible payments of any
method the PM may use to choose which proposals to implement. 
In addition to these results, Propositions 5 and 7 both continue to hold under A2.
B.7. Noisy quality signals. The model assumes that IGs perfectly observe the quality
of their own proposals. It is possible, however, that IGs are not perfectly aware of how
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the policymaker will perceive their proposal’s quality following a review. For example,
an IG may know everything about its own proposal without knowing the policymaker’s
priorities. We may think of such a situation as each IG observing a noisy signal si about
its true proposal quality qi. Higher si tend to correspond to higher qi. In this setting,
the policymaker may still award attention through a contest, in which case IGs with
higher signals submit higher payments as they compete for attention. In equilibrium,
the policymaker directly observes the quality of any proposal he reviews, and can infer
the signals associated with the proposals he does not review. The policymaker is less
informed than in the case when IGs perfectly observe their quality. However, he is
still more informed than if he awarded the same number of review slots through a less
informative mechanism.
In this alternative setting, the policymaker benefits from reviewing additional pro-
posals as long as k ≤ m. However, it is not clear that the policymaker is better off
reviewing k > m proposals compared to k = m. Reviewing more proposals leads the
policymaker to be better informed about additional proposals, but reviewing more than
m proposals undermines the full-information equilibrium and prevents the policymaker
from becoming informed about the proposals he does not review.
B.8. Allocating a divisible resource.
B.9. Allocating a divisible resource. Throughout the paper, the policymaker can either
fully implement or not implement each proposal. Our framework best represents an
environment where the policy choice is discrete: a legislator chooses whether or not to
introduce legislation or to vote for each reform proposal, and whether or not to request
earmark funding from the appropriations committee for each proposed district project.
In some settings, however, a policymaker not only must decide whether to support
each proposal, he must also decide “how much” support to give. For example, after
the U.S. Congress allocates a budget to the Department of Transportation (DOT), the
DOT must choose how to divide highway funding between the 50 states. Each state
will receive some funding, but the DOT prefers to allocate more funding to states with
greater need. The states, their representatives, and regional contractors lobby the DOT
to attract greater funding for their own projects.
In this section, we discuss an environment where the policymaker’s policy choice
p = (p1, ..., pn) represents a vector of allocations, where pi is the allocation provided
to IGi. Here, pi is not constrained to be either zero or one, but is allowed to take on
other values. The policymaker’s optimal choice of pi is strictly increasing in qi and
strictly decreasing in qj for all j 6= i. That is, the policymaker wants to give a larger
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share of the budget to the higher quality IGs.32 We refer to this alternative policymaking
environment as a game with divisible resources.
Cotton (2009) considers a contest for attention in a very simple version of this policy-
making environment, assuming only two interest groups and that the optimal allocation
to IGi equals qi − q−i. The paper shows that in such a simple version of the divisible
resource game, the policymaker can become fully informed about the quality of both
IGs if he sells attention to one of the groups using an all pay auction. The result suggests
that the most important result from the non-divisible allocation game—that by giving
attention to the highest contributors, a policymaker can become fully informed and im-
plement the first best policy—may carry over to the game with divisible resources. We
show that this is generally true in the online appendix of the current paper, which con-
siders a greatly generalized divisible resource game.
There are noteworthy differences between the non-divisible allocation model consid-
ered throughout the majority of this paper and the divisible resource model considered
here. First, one can show that there is a unique symmetric full-information equilibrium
in the game with divisible resources. This means that the issues involving the multiplic-
ity of relevant equilibria is not present in the divisible resource environment. Second, in
the unique equilibrium of the divisible resource game, each IG expects a positive payoff.
This is in contrast to the payment-maximizing equilibrium of the non divisible allocation
game, where the policymaker captured all rent. In the divisible resource game, no pay-
ment maximizing equilibrium exists. Despite these differences, the main result remains
the same in both environments. By selling attention to the highest bidder, the PM can
become fully informed about the quality of all IGs, even those he does not review di-
rectly. This allows him to implement his first best allocation, as if he was fully informed.
Selling attention to the highest bidder can improve policy outcomes.
In the body of the paper, we consider settings in which the policymaker (PM) has a
limited number of non divisible “prizes” which he must split among the IGs. There are
fewer prizes than IGs, and each IG can receive at most one prize. This means that an
IG either received a full prize, which it valued at v, or received nothing. In this online
section, we allow for divisible prizes. Here, the PM must divide a limited resource
across the n IGs. This alternative framework may represent the division of a budget
across different resources.
As before, there are n IGs, indexed by i = 1, ..., n. Each IGi privately observes its own
quality qi. Its quality is the independent realization of continuous, twice differentiable
32One may envision a setting in which the policymaker divides a fixed budget between the n projects,
and pi > 0 for each IG. But, neither the fixed budget nor the restriction to strictly positive transfers are
necessary for the analysis. It only matters that the optimal choice of pi is increasing in qi and decreasing
in the quality of others.
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distribution F on which there are no mass points. The distribution has pdf f , and
support Q = (0, qmax]. Let q = {q1, .., qn} and q−i = {q1, ..., qi−1, qi+1, ..., qn}.
The PM chooses an allocation amount ai to provide each IGi. Function A(qi, q−i)
gives the PM’s optimal choice of allocation, ai, for an IG with quality qi, when other IGs
have quality q−i. When the policymaker is fully informed about q, he will implement
ai = A(qi, q−i) for each i = 1, ..., n. We impose two assumptions on A in order to simplify
the analysis. First, the PM-preferred ai is strictly increasing in i’s own quality, and
strictly decreasing in the quality of all other IGs. That is, for each i, ∂A(qi, q−i)/∂qi > 0
and ∂A(qi, q−i)/∂qj < 0 for all j 6= i and every q ∈ Qn. Second, the optimal allocation
functions are independent of the IGs’ identities: A(qi, q−i) is independent of the ordering
of q−i, which also implies that ∂A(qi, q−i)/∂qj = ∂A(qi, q−i)/∂qk for qj = qk and j, k 6= i.
The structure of the game otherwise remains unchanged from the non-divisible prize
framework considered in the body of the paper. The PM reviews k (where k ∈ 1, ..., n− 1)
IGs before choosing an allocation a = {a1, ..., an}. If the PM reviews IGi, he directly
observes qi. If the PM does not review IGi, then he updates his beliefs about qi account-
ing for any contribution ci ≥ 0 provided by the IG. The game takes place as follows:
First, IGs independently and simultaneously provide contributions. The PM observes
all contributions, and directly observes the quality of the k IGs that provide the highest
contributions. He updates his beliefs about q given these observations. Finally, the PM
implements an allocation.
Here, we derive an equilibrium of the contest for attention with divisible prizes in
which each IGi contributes according to a payment function C¯∗ that is strictly increasing
in its privately observed quality qi. Lemma 1 continues to hold in this environment,
and implies that such an equilibrium is a full-information equilibrium in which the PM
implements policy as if he is fully informed. That is, in such an equilibrium, the PM
implements ai = A(qi, q−i) for each i. Since C¯∗ is strictly increasing, it is invertible. We
define Q∗ ≡ C¯∗−1.
To derive the equilibrium payment function C¯∗, we consider the optimal choice of
contribution ci by IGi when all other IGs contribute according to the strictly increasing
contribution function. Notice that because the other n− 1 IGs contribute according to
the equilibrium contribution function, the PM’s beliefs about q−i are always correct.
However, his beliefs about qi will be incorrect if IGi chooses some ci 6= C¯∗(qi) and does
not receive attention. IGi will receive attention if fewer than k other IGs contribute
cj > ci. This is equivalent to fewer than k others having qj such that C¯∗(qj) > ci, or
equivalently qj > Q∗(ci).
Function Ω(qi; q−i) indicates whether IGi receives attention in equilibrium when it
has quality qi and the other IGs have quality q−i. Therefore, Ω(Q∗(ci); q−1) indicates
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whether IGi receives attention when it contributes ci. It equals 1 when fewer than k
other IGs have qj > Q∗(ci) and equals 0 otherwise. If IGi receives attention, the PM
directly observes qi and implements an allocation a such that ai = A(qi, q−i). If IGi does
not receive attention, the PM infers qi from ci, believing qi = Q∗(ci). In this case, he
implements an allocation in which ai = A(Q∗(ci), q−i).
IGi’s expected payoff from contribution ci when the other n− 1 IGs contribute accord-
ing to strictly increasing equilibrium payment function C¯∗ is∫
q−i
f (q−i)
[
Ω(Q∗(ci); q−i)A(qi, q−i) + (1−Ω(Q∗(ci); q−i))A(Q∗(ci), q−i)
]
dq−i − ci.
(36)
Following the proofs in the body of the paper, we can apply the revelation principle
in solving the problem. This approach means that each IG announces its quality qˆi,
and the equilibrium payment functions C∗i must be each IG prefers to announce quality
truthfully, qˆi = qi. Therefore, (36) may be rewritten in terms of IGi’s choice of qˆi.∫
q−i
f (q−i)
[
Ω(qˆi; q−i)A(qi, q−i) + (1−Ω(qˆi; q−i))A(qˆi, q−i)
]
dq−i − C¯∗(qˆi). (37)
The derivative of this expression with respect to ci is∫
q−i f (q−i)
[
∂Ω(qˆi;q−i)
∂qi
(
A(qi, q−i)− A(qˆi, q−i)
)
+ (1−Ω(qˆi; q−i)) ∂A(qˆi,q−i)∂qi
]
dq−i − C¯∗′(qˆi).
(38)
We set (38) equal to zero and simplify the expression given the equilibrium requirement
that qˆi = qi. This gives us an equation for C¯∗′(qi).
C¯∗′(qi) =
∫
q−i
f (q−i)(1−Ω(qi; q−i))∂A(qi, q−i)∂qi dq−i. (39)
We show that C¯∗ such that C¯∗(0) = 0 and (39) is an equilibrium of the game. Such a
function will be an equilibrium if, given C¯∗ and for all qi ∈ Q, (38) is increasing in qˆi for
all qˆi < qi, and decreasing in qˆi for all qˆi > qi. To see that this is the case, first simplify
(38) by substituting in an expression for C¯∗′ as given by (39). Doing this causes (38) to
simplify to ∫
q−i f (q−i)
∂Ω(qˆi;q−i)
∂qi
(
A(qi, q−i)− A(qˆi, q−i)
)
dq−i. (40)
This expression is strictly positive if qˆi < qi, and strictly negative if qˆi > qi. Therefore,
it is unique best response for IGi to truthfully announce qˆi = qi when payments are
imposed by C¯∗ satisfies C¯∗(0) = 0 and (39). This means that in the original game, prior
to the use of the revelation principle to transform the game, it is a unique best response
for IGi to contribute according to C¯∗ when all other IGs also do so, and the PM expects
IGi to do so. That is, there is a symmetric full-information equilibrium in which C∗i = C¯
∗
for all i = 1, ..., n.
COMPETING FOR ATTENTION xix
There are some noteworthy differences between the equilibrium of the game with di-
visible prizes and the equilibrium of the game with a limited number of non-divisible
prizes studies in the body of the paper. First, one can show that the symmetric full-
information equilibrium derived above is the unique symmetric full-information equi-
librium of the game with divisible prizes. This is in contrast with the body of the paper,
where there were multiple symmetric full-information equilibria in the discrete prize
game. Second, one can also show that the IGs each expect positive payoffs in the equi-
librium of the divisible prize game. In this environment, unlike in the discrete prize
game, no payment-maximizing full-information equilibrium exists. This was an essen-
tial component of the analysis of the more simple structure in Cotton (2009), where
directly selling policy resulted in higher payments than selling attention.
Despite these differences, however, the main result remains the same in both environ-
ments. By selling attention to the highest bidder, the PM can become fully informed
about the quality of all IGs, even those he does not review directly. This allows him to
implement his first best allocation, as if he was fully informed. Selling attention to the
highest bidder can improve policy outcomes.
